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My dissertation is composed of three essays on Development Economics in
China. The first chapter, co-authored with Hongbin Li, evaluates the impact of the
8-7 Plan, the second wave of China’s poverty alleviation program, on rural income
growth at the county level over the period 1994-2000. Since program participation
was largely determined by whether a county’s pre-program income fell below a given
poverty line, a regression discontinuity approach is employed to estimate causal
effects of the program. Using a panel dataset, we find that the 8-7 Plan resulted in
a gain of about a 26 percent increase in rural income for the counties which were
treated. Our empirical results also suggest an important role for initial endowments
in the path towards economic development.
The second chapter examines the question: How much of the increase in the
sex ratio (males to females) at birth since the early 1980s in China is due to in-
creased prenatal sex selection? I answer this question by exploiting the differential
introduction of diagnostic ultrasound throughout China during the 1980s, which
significantly reduced the cost of prenatal sex selection. The improved local access
to ultrasound technology is found to have resulted in a substantial increase in the
sex ratio at birth. Furthermore, this effect was driven solely by a rise in the sex ratio
of higher order births, especially following births of daughters. I estimate that the
local access to ultrasound increased the fraction of males by 1.3 percentage points
for second births and by 2.4 percentage points for third and higher order births.
Using the annual birth rate at the county level as a proxy for local enforcement of
the One Child Policy, the effects of ultrasound are found to be stronger for individ-
uals under tighter fertility control. These findings suggest that the current trend
in skewed sex ratios in China is significantly influenced by prenatal sex selection.
Several robustness checks indicate that these results are not driven by preexisting
differential trends.
The third chapter, co-authored with Douglas Almond and Hongbin Li, explores
the gender bias in parental investment in children’s health in China. Where the frac-
tion of male births is abnormally high, heterogeneity in son preference would suggest
that parents of sons may have a stronger son preference than parents of daughters.
Child sex may have become a stronger signal of parental sex preferences over time
as the cost of sex selection has declined and sex ratios at birth have increased. In
this chapter, we consider whether ultrasound diffusion changed the pattern of early
childhood investments in girls versus boys. If parental investments (like sex ratios)
respond to parental sex preferences, postnatal investments in girls should increase
with the diffusion of ultrasound and increased prenatal sex selection. In contrast,
the prediction for investments prior to birth is ambiguous. For pregnancies carried
to term, ultrasound revealed sex as much as six months prior to delivery, enabling
gender discrimination in in utero investments. In contrast, sex selective abortions
would tend to increase in utero investments in girls through preference sorting. We
evaluate these competing predictions using microdata on investments in children
using the 1992 Chinese Children Survey. We find no effect of ultrasound access on
the gender difference in postnatal investments. In contrast, we find early neonatal
mortality of girls increased relative to boys with ultrasound access. As neonatal
mortality tends to reflect pregnancy conditions, we infer that prenatal investments
for girls carried to term may have fallen relative to boys once fetal sex was revealed.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating China’s Poverty Alleviation Program: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach
1.1 Introduction
Evidence from cross-country studies suggests that sustained economic growth
has typically been poverty-reducing (Ravallion and Chen, 1997; Dollar and Kraay,
2002). However, broad-based growth is not always the panacea for curing poverty
(Morduch, 2000). Due perhaps to inferior initial conditions, the impoverished peo-
ple residing in certain regions are unable to fully share the gains from aggregate high
growth (Ravallion and Jalan, 1999). As a response to concerns about the lagging
poor, public efforts have been taken in many countries in the form of poor area de-
velopment programs to fight poverty and reduce inequality. Despite the theoretical
underpinnings of the strategies pursued, whether these programs worked as intended
is mainly an empirical issue.
This paper evaluates the large-scale poverty alleviation program instituted by
the Chinese government in 1994. Known as the 8-7 Plan, it aspired to promote
local economic development through targeted public investments. The program is
impressive in terms of scale and its public outlay. In a bid to lift the majority of the
remaining 80 million poor out of poverty by 2000, the program covered a total of
1
592 counties, or 28 percent of all county-level administrative units in China. Over
the course of its seven-year operation, the program cost RMB 1240 billion (USD
14.9 billion equivalent), an annual 5-7 percent of China’s central government expen-
ditures. Three distinctive features of this program also deserve special emphasis.
First, the program assignment was based on an indicator-based targeting scheme,
which relies on an (or a set of) identifiable characteristic(s) to identify the poor.
Second, the interventions, which were administered at the county level, intended
to promote permanent income growth by supporting productive investment rather
than subsidizing consumption. Third, the Chinese central government delegated the
implementation of the program to local governments. Moreover, the central govern-
ment resorted to its political personnel control to motivate local officials to promote
economic development.
The 8-7 plan is pre-dated by the first wave of China’s poverty program, which
is very similar in content but smaller in scale. A modest literature evaluating the
first wave interventions suggests that the program was successful in raising income
and consumption of people living in the poor counties (Jalan and Ravallion, 1998;
Rozelle et al., 1998; Park et al., 2002). As an aside, Park et al. (2002) also examines
the performance of the 8-7 Plan after its first full year of implementation. It finds
that the program increased per capita income growth by 0.91 percent during the
period 1992-1995. Albeit an interim evaluation, it is the only study that we are
aware of that assesses the effectiveness of the 8-7 Plan. Nevertheless, given the fact
that the new wave of program did not come into effect until 1994, an estimate of
the program impact of a longer term is needed to assess its overall efficacy.
2
Estimating program effectiveness is often complicated by the nonrandomness
of program placement (Ravallion, 2008). This problem is especially relevant when
public interventions are targeted based on certain average individual characteristics.
In our context, if the treated counties benefited more from the aggregate economic
growth than the untreated counties due to geographic differences, a “naive” compar-
ison of gain incomes can lead to an underestimation of the program effect. On the
contrary, upward bias could rise when political connections were important. The
program effect could also be overstated if those selected into the program had expe-
rienced adverse shocks prior to eligibility, relative to those that were not selected.
To deal with the endogeneity problem, we implement a regression discontinuity ap-
proach that is facilitated by the program’s discrete assignment rule. In particular,
program placement was largely determined by whether a county’s pre-program per
capita income fell below certain poverty lines. As such, causal impacts of the pro-
gram can be gauged by comparing counties clustering just below the dividing line
to counties just above.
We make use of the discontinuity of program assignment at the eligibility
threshold to construct an instrumental variable for actual treatment status. Em-
ploying a panel data set of roughly 1700 Chinese counties over 20 years, our two-
stage least squares results show that the 8-7 Plan had a large positive impact on
rural income growth. We estimate that the program increased 1994-2000 per capita
income gains by about 26 percent (0.7 standard deviation). By contrast, the esti-
mates obtained from a conventional difference-in-differences approach suggest that
the program was associated with only a 15 percent increase in per capita income,
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which understate the positive program impact by over 40 percent. The overall di-
rection of the bias in the “conventional” estimates indirectly reveals the significant
role of initial conditions in subsequent economic development.
To explore whether the program has a persistent effect, we use the change
in log income per capita 1994-2003 as the outcome variable that measures income
growth in a longer time horizon. It turns out that the estimates of the program
effect in a “longer-run” are slightly smaller in magnitude, and also less precisely
estimated for subsamples close to the threshold. This finding indicates that the
program might have had only sizable short-run effects that started to decay just a
few years after its implementation.
Importantly, the estimates of the program effects from our design are robust
across a variety of specifications. They are insensitive to the inclusion of various
control variables, and different functional form choices. Moreover, the estimates
are also insensitive to the exclusion of observations far away from the cutoff point.
Finally, we show that our results are unlikely to be driven by discontinuities in
pre-program county characteristics or endogenous sorting around the threshold.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some
background information on poverty in China and the poverty alleviation program.
Section 3 illustrates our empirical strategy and Section 4 describes the data used.
Section 5 reports the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Background
1.2.1 Poverty in China
In China poverty is closely linked to geography (Ravallion and Jalan, 1999).
There is a marked difference between rural and urban areas, with existing evidence
pointing towards poverty being mainly a rural phenomenon (World Bank, 2000).
Moreover, there are greater differences in the incidence of rural poverty between
the prosperous coastal areas and the less developed and most poverty-prone inland
areas. Figure 1.1 shows the geographic distribution of the incidence of rural poverty
in 1991 at the provincial level. A province’s shading indicates its rural poverty
incidence, in which darker shading represents higher level of incidence. The graph
clearly shows the geographic concentration of poverty in inland areas.
Official statistics indicate that the poor population has been declining during
the 1990s. Figure 1.2 plots trends from 1990-2000 in the entire nation’s official
poverty headcount. Poverty reduction was impressive over the period, with both the
number of poor population and the incidence of poverty experiencing a dramatic
decline. The population identified as poor fell from 85 million in 1990 to 32 million
in 2000. As a share of the rural population, the poverty headcount fell from 9.5
percent in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 2000.
1.2.2 Poverty Alleviation Program in China
In response to concerns about the lagging poor, the Chinese central government
launched an ambitious anti-poverty program in the mid-1980’s. An interministeral
5
Leading Group for Poverty Reduction (henthforth the Leading Group) was founded
in 1986 to supervise and coordinate the implementation of the entire program. Two
features of the new program distinguish itself from China’s prior poverty reduction
efforts. First, program assignment was based on a system of county-level targeting.
In recognition of the remarkably uneven distribution of poverty across the country,
the planner decided to use a targeting device to disburse limited funds to areas of
the greatest need. Second, the newly adopted measures introduced a new emphasis
on promoting economic development. Unlike prior welfare and relief programs, the
transfer was not intended for direct consumption. Rather, resources were primarily
channeled toward economic development and revenue-generating activities, which
we elaborate below.
A priority ranking of counties is based on a statistic known as the rural net in-
come per capita.1 Each year, every county-level statistical agency randomly chooses
around 100 rural households as the survey sample. The sample households are told
to keep records of their revenues and expenditures in either nominal or real terms.
Finally, those data are collected and aggregated, based on which the statistic is com-
puted. This measure is one of the most important official poverty statistics that the
Chinese government often relies on in welfare assessment in rural areas and related
policy making (Park and Wang, 2001).
In 1986, the Leading Group initially identified 258 counties as National Poor
Counties according to a mixed set of poverty lines. In general, counties with ru-
1This approach is known as an indicator-based targeting, or statistical targeting, which relies
on certain key indicators to administer interventions (Besley and Kanbur, 1993).
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ral net income per capita below 150 yuan were designated as poor. For political
considerations, the poverty line was raised to 200 for minority counties and 300 for
“revolutionary base” counties. However in practice, the explicit criteria for desig-
nation were not strictly enforced.2
Although the first-round designation had captured a sizeable fraction of the
poor population, there had been considerable criticism raised against the approach
for program placement. The goal of poverty alleviation was heavily compromised
by politics (Park et al., 2002). In some provinces, the inclusion of politically favored
counties even crowded out counties below the mandated poverty line (World Bank,
2000). Further, the validity of the poverty lines used for designation was questioned
by researchers. Partially in response to these criticisms, the Leading group adopted
a renewed poverty line, according to which major revision was made to its list of
National Poor Counties in 1993. In principle, the standard for choosing poor counties
was rural net income per capita below 400 yuan in 1992. However, faced with the
pressure from previously designated counties, the central government decided to
raised the poverty line to 700 for the counties label as “poor” before 1993.3 The
new adjustment raised the number of National Poor Counties to 592, almost a third
of all counties in China. The red shaded regions in Figure 1.3 show the designated
counties, clustering mostly in inland and mountainous areas. Compared with the
2Another 73 counties were added in the three years that followed. For a detailed description of
the first-round designation, see Park et al. (2002).
3It is worth pointing out here that the 1994 designation employed the 1992 data to assign
programs and the poverty lines were not made public until the data collecting was completed.
This setting makes any precise sorting around the eligibility cutoff unlikely.
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previous wave of designation, the new list certainly did a better job covering the
poorest population. The government estimates suggest that over 72 percent of the
rural poor were residing in the newly designated counties. This second wave of
designating poor counties in 1993 and subsequent development assistance are also
known as the 8-7 Plan4.
The package of interventions in the 8-7 Plan was comprised of three major
components. First, the targeted counties received credit assistance. This subsidized
loan program is the largest of the poverty programs. The government has invested
about RMB 27.8 billion (1994 price) in the subsidized loan program during this 7
year period. Each year, the funds for loans were disbursed by the People’s Bank
of China (the central bank) to the provincial Agricultural Banks of China (ABC’s),
which in turn made allocations to their lower level branches, following the scheme set
up by the Leading Group. The final decisions to lend were made jointly by county-
level offices of the Leading Group and ABC. The subsidized annual interest rate was
2.88 percent. Prior to 1996, the bulk of the loans were channeled to rural enterprises
rather than rural households. After that, the priority of allocation switched back
toward households.
Second, the Ministry of Finance provided budgetary grants for investment in
poor counties. The funds, primarily managed through the fiscal system, totaled
around RMB 12.5 billion (1994 price) over the years. Upon approval by the Lead-
ing Group, the Ministry of Finance made allocations to provincial departments of
4The program was called “8-7 Plan” because its main objective was to lift the majority of the
remaining 80 million poor above the government’s poverty line within 7 years.
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finance. Provincial departments of finance then transmitted the funds to county
finance bureaus, which administered the final disbursements in cooperation with
the respective sectoral county government departments. The majority of the funds
came in the form of Poor Area Development Funds, which were used for productive
construction projects. Other budgetary grants were provided through earmarked
grants for basic education, health care and so forth.
Third, public employed projects (Food-for-Work) were established in the des-
ignated areas. The program sought to raise the long-term development capacity
of poor areas by supporting the construction of basic infrastructure, such as roads,
drinking water systems, and land improvement. Meanwhile, it also expected to
provide short-term assistance to the poor by creating more jobs. The central gov-
ernment distributed coupons to relevant local planning commissions, which used
them to pay for the physical inputs and labor done under the program. In general,
the central and provincial governments made decisions on the types of investment.
County government selected sites and village committees were responsible for the
allocation of project investment and labor contribution.
Apart from its huge spending, the central government also tried to meet its
poverty reduction goals by making use of its unique personnel control system.5 In
a meeting called by the central government in 1996, its stated clearly how it would
reward or punish local government officials according to their performance regarding
poverty alleviation. In particular, local officials were to be demoted had they failed
5For a review of China’s personnel control system and empirical evidence on its incentive role
in local economic development, see Li and Zhou (2005).
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to accomplish certain poverty reduction objectives set by the central government.
The implementation of the entire project was supervised by the Leading Group.
All counties designated as poor got treated with roughly the same intensity. In
the analysis that follows, we assume homogeneous treatment intensity and try to
estimate the collective impact of the whole bundle of interventions received by the
Poor Counties.
1.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss the econometric models employed to estimate the
program impact. Absent a random assignment, one could assess the program effect
under a difference-in-differences (DD) framework, i.e. to see whether the income
increases more among National Poor Counties than among undesignated counties,
∆ log yi = log y
00
i − log y94i = α + β · NP94i + ε00i − ε94i (1.1)
where ∆ log yi is the change in log rural net income per capita in county i from 1994
to 2000; NP94i is a binary indicator equal to one if county i was designated as poor
in 1994; and εti represents unobserved county-level factors of county i in year t. β is
the parameter of interest, which measures the program impact.
Consistent estimation of β using least squares requires E[NP94i ·(ε00i −ε94i )] = 0.
If the omitted transitory factors that affect income growth are at the same time
correlated with National Poor County status, then the DD approach will yield an
inconsistent estimate of the true parameter. Poor and non-poor counties differ
dramatically in terms of local “initial conditions” such as geography. If geography,
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for instance, has different effects on income in different years, it cannot be treated
as a fixed effect and is not removed by first-differencing. In particular, non-poor
counties mostly lie in coastal and less hilly areas, whereas poor counties tend to
be concentrated in remote upland areas. If geographic disparities are important,
non-poor counties certainly can benefit more from the fast-growing economy as a
whole than poor counties. In this sense, a simple comparison of gain incomes in
poor and non-poor counties can lead to an underestimation of the program effect.6
The DD estimator could also exaggerate the program’s effectiveness. Being
designated as poor is partially driven by the transitory shock ε92i . Suppose there is
some transitory shock εti that is serially correlated. If the shock lingers on for at
least two years but wears off almost completely in twelve years, a subsequent rise in
yt+8i among the treated is expected even in the absence of a true program effect.
7 In
addition, estimation of β is confounded by unobserved factors such as the change in
central leaders’ preferences toward certain local leaders/areas, which simultaneously
affects the selection of poor counties and local income growth (Park et al., 2002). All
the problems described above render the DD estimator unattractive for our purpose.
By tying the decision of designation to certain poverty lines, the assignment
rule for the poverty programs in China creates a discrete relationship between a
county’s pre-program performance (the criteria variable) and its probability of being
6In a very similar argument, Ravallion and Jalan (1999) points out that “geographic externali-
ties” is a particularly significant source of bias in conventional evaluations of poor-area programs.
7This problem is analogous to that observed in the analysis of training programs, in which par-
ticipants are selected into treatment after experiencing a decline in pre-program earnings (Ashen-
felter, 1978).
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treated (aka. propensity score). This provides an excellent opportunity to estimate
the causal effects of the poverty alleviation program with a Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design (Hahn et al., 2001). The simplest version of a RD design is known as the
Sharp Design, when there is a perfect relationship between the treatment status and
the selection variable (Lee, 2008). However in many cases, this relationship might
be imperfect when the observed selection criterion is not strictly followed. The
administrator may rely on other factors to assign treatment, but these additional
variables might be unobserved by the researcher. In this case the assignment to
treatment depends on the selection variable in a stochastic manner. This setup
corresponds with a Fuzzy Design.
It is useful to conceptualize the RD approach in an instrumental variable (IV)
framework in case of a Fuzzy Design (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; van der Klaauw, 2002).
In essence, we use the initial eligibility of the program, Eligiblei = 1(y
92
i < ȳ),
as an instrument for actual National Poor County status, NP94i. Here 1(·) is an
indicator function which equals unity when the embraced statement is true; ȳ is the
publicized threshold of National Poor County (NP94) eligibility. The parametric
first-stage and reduced-form equations are
NP94i = π0 + π1 · Eligiblei + f(y92i ) + ui (1.2)
and
∆ log yi = γ0 + γ1 · Eligiblei + g(y92i ) + vi (1.3)
where f(·) and g(·) are smooth funtions of the selection variable. π1 captures the
discontinuous change in the propensity score at the cutoff; γ1 measures the relative
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difference in the outcome variable for counties above and below the cutoff. In an
exactly identified case like ours, the IV estimator, βIV, is simply the ratio γ1/π1.
The above specification assumes that the impacts of the program are homogeneous.
And as the detailed information on the implementation of individual counties is not
available, we also have to assume that the program intensity is the same for every
county. The key assumption for identification here is that there is no discontinuity
in counterfactual outcomes at the critical cutoff. In practice, we model f(·) and g(·)
as lower-order polynomials and simple Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) implicitly
assumes that both functions are approximated by polynomials of the same order.
Since two different types of counties face two distinct cutoffs as described in the
background section, we also include county-type fix-effects in our empirical model.
1.4 Data
In this paper, we use a socio-economic dataset on 1947 Chinese counties in
30 provinces over 20 years (1981-1995) collected by the Ministry of Agriculture.
County is the unit of observation. The data set contains both economic variables and
information on population and geography for each county. It is worth noting that the
rural net income per capita, the variable used for program assignment and welfare
assessment, is observed in this data set. We supplement the data set with economic
variables for the years of 2000 and 2003 from various issues of the Yearbooks of
Agricultural Development Bank of China. Price deflators at the province level are
obtained from the China Compendium of Statistics 1949-2004. Due to missing
13
information on the county-level income per capita for a few counties in certain
years, our major sample has approximately 1700 observations.
Descriptive statistics of the key variables are provided in Table 1.1. To fa-
cilitate the comparison of baseline characteristics between the poor counties and
non-poor counties, we also provide descriptive statistics by Poor County status in
Table 1.2.
About 28% of the counties were designated as National Poor Counties in 1994.
Note that the 1992 rural net income per capita (current price) were used to assign
the program. Further, 1994 was the first full year of treatment and the program was
phased out after 2000. During this period, the average growth rate in per capita
income is 0.52 log point.
The statistics show that the National Poor Counties are indeed much poorer
than the Non-Poor Counties before the program was introduced. In 1994, average
per capita income of the Non-Poor Counties was 84% higher than that of the Na-
tional Poor Counties. In 2002, however, average per capita income of the Non-Poor
Counties was only 51% higher than that of the National Poor Counties. Comparison
of Changes in log income per capita by treatment status suggests that income for
the Poor Counties was growing faster than the Non-Poor Counties during the period
when the program was effective. However, we cannot simply interpret the difference




1.5.1 Main Results on Income Growth
In this subsection, we systematically test whether the poverty alleviation pro-
gram has a positive impact on rural income. Unless otherwise noted, we use the
Eicker-White robust standard errors for inference.
As a useful benchmark for our analysis, we first present simple difference-in-
differences estimates of the program effect in Table 1.3. The dependent variable is
the the change in log income per capita 1994-2000. Column 1 gives the unadjusted
correlation between the dependent variable and the designation status. The coef-
ficient on the treatment dummy is positive and statistically significant at the one
percent level. It suggests that the program is helping the poor counties: over the
decade, counties with designation had about a 18 percent relative gain in rural net
income per capita. To see if the NP94 indicator has picked up any cross-county
variation along other dimensions, column 2 introduces into the regression a set of
pre-program county-level variables, namely the population, sown area, grain produc-
tion per capita and industrial income per capita in 1994. After the adjustment for
covariates, the magnitude of the estimated program effect decreases slightly but still
remains statistically significant. Column 3 further includes province fixed-effects in
the regression, allowing only with-in province comparisons of counties. This exer-
cise leads to only marginal change in the size of the estimate. The implied program
effect is around 12 percent gain in per capita income.
As discussed earlier, the first differencing approach is unable to control for
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time-varying factors that affect both designation status and income. To address
this concern, we next implement the instrumental variable approach described in
section 3 to estimate the program effects. We use the indicator of initial eligibility
to instrument for the actual designation status in 1994.
Prior to presenting the formal regression results, we first provide some graph-
ical evidence. Figure 1.4 plots the first-stage relation between a county’s 1992 per
capita income relative to the cutoff and its probability of being treated. Each data
point (solid square) represents the fraction of counties designated as poor within 10
yuan intervals of the 1992 income per capita relative to cutoff. The figure present
dramatic evidence that there is indeed a stark change in the probability of being
treated around the cutoff. Visually the probability of treatment is approximately
0.60 higher among the initially eligible counties.
Figure 1.5 shows a scattered plot of each county’s change in log income per
capita, the outcome of interest, against its income per capita relative to the eligibility
cutoff in 1992, the running variable. The continuous line is the predicted outcome
from a regression that includes a third order polynomial in the running variable,
and a dummy for observations above the cutoff. The dashed lines are pointwise 95
percent confidence intervals from the regression. There is a clearly discernible gap
in the predicted outcome at the threshold. Compare the counties which were barely
eligible (for example, the income relative to cutoff is -5 yuan), with counties which
were barely ineligible (for example, the income relative to cutoff is 5 yuan). With
a valid regression discontinuity design, the two groups should on average be similar
in every respect except having different propensity scores. Therefore the break of
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the fitted line at the cutoff is an estimate of parameter π1 in equation (2) (without
any adjustment of covariates), equal to roughly 0.1.
Table 1.4 (Panel A) reports the results from estimating equation (2), the first-
stage relation between actual treatment, the dependent variable, and initial eligibil-
ity. Column (1) shows the results from our most parsimonious specification, where
eligibility is the only regressor other than provincial and county-type dummies. The
coefficient on eligibility is highly significant and large in magnitude, and the R2
exceeds 0.6. Consistent with the graphical evidence, the eligible counties, i.e., those
below the official poverty line, have a significantly higher probability of being des-
ignated. The size of this estimate remains substantial (greater than 0.45) when a
cubic of the running variable and other controls are included (columns 2-4). In sum-
mary, these results indicate that a 1992 per capita income above the official poverty
line is a strong predictor of the actual treatment status.
Panel B contains the results from estimating equation (3), the reduced-form
model. We regress change in log income on the indicator for program eligibility.
Column (1)-(4) give the results of regressions using the same specifications as in
Panel A. The eligibility coefficients are always positive and significant at least at
the 1-percent level. Moreover, the fit of the regressions is considerably good. From
a model with the richest set of controls in column (4), the estimated impact of
eligibility is 12 percent, equivalent to a 0.3 standard deviation of the change in log
income.
Panel C presents the instrumental variable results for a variety of specifica-
tions. These estimates are just the ratio of the reduced-form coefficients (in Panel
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A) and first-stage estimates (in Panel B). The estimate in column (1) suggests a
large effect when the selection variable is not controlled for. As column (2) includes
the running variable, the NP94 coefficient shrinks by approximately a third. Adding
a cubic of the running variable further decreases the size of the estimate, as shown
in column (3). The coefficient is large in magnitude and significant at the 1-percent
level, and it implies that in 1994-2000, designated counties had about a 28 percent
increase in income per capita (a 0.7 standard deviation). Further, this estimate is
insensitive to including other county-level covariates (column 4). Overall, the IV
estimates for the program effect are always significant and relatively stable across
specifications.
For our parametric estimates to be credible, identification of the intercept shift
at the threshold should not rely solely on particular functional forms, or on data
points in the extreme ends of the distribution. To address this concern, we add
higher order polynomials and limit our sample within increasingly narrow intervals
around the cutoff. Table 1.5 reports the results from these exercises. For the sake of
comparison, column (1) reproduces the results from column (4), Panel C in Table
1.4. In the next column, a quartic term is included and the entire sample is used
for estimation. The parameter estimate is very similar to that from the previous
specification. In the following two columns, we focus on counties within 1000 yuan
of their respective cutoffs and experiment with different functional forms. Our
estimates appear robust to these changes. Columns (5)-(6) repeat the exercise with
a “±500 yuan” window. Again, the estimated effects are statistically significant and
comparable in magnitude. Broadly speaking, our estimates are largely insensitive
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to the choice of functional forms and samples.
To see if the program has a lasting effect on income growth, we also use the
change in log income per capita 1994-2003 as the outcome variable. Remember that
the program under consideration did not phase out until 2000. Instead of looking at
the program’s impact immediately after its implementation, we are now allowing for
a three-year lag when constructing the growth measure. If the program does have
a persistent effect, estimates using this new outcome variable should be at least as
large as the estimates from the previous analysis for a shorter period. Table 1.6
repeats the exercise as in Table 1.5, this time with the longer-run growth measure
as the outcome of interest. Overall, the 2SLS produces positive and relatively stable
estimates (around 20-30 percent) for different specifications. However, compared
to results from the last table, the estimated program impacts on the 94-03 income
growth are slightly smaller in magnitude and less robust to changes in specification.
In particular, the “long-run” estimates are insignificant for the subsample of counties
with 500 yuan around the eligibility cutoff. These results, taken in conjunction with
the “short-run” estimates from the previous table, indicate that the 8-7 Plan might
have merely created a spurt in income that began to decay after only three years.
1.5.2 Specification Checks
For our empirical strategy to be valid, National Poor Counties and Non-
National Poor Counties around the eligibility threshold should have similar pre-
program trends in income growth. For a first robustness check, we use the change in
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log income per capita 1992-1994 as the outcome of interest (recall that the program
was not introduced until 1994). In the absence of any differential trends between
the treated and the untreated close to the cutoff, the expectation is that the 2SLS
estimates using the Eligibility as the instrument for actual treatment should yield
estimates that are statistically insignificant from zero. The IV estimates of the
program effects on the pre-program income growth are reported in Table 1.7. The
structure of the table is similar to Tables 1.5 and 1.6, which displays estimates from
various specifications using different functional forms and samples within increas-
ingly narrow intervals near the cutoff point. Overall, the 2SLS estimates are very
smaller in magnitude none of them are statistically insignificant at conventional
levels, which reveals no differential trends around the cutoff.
The identifying assumption underlying the RD design is that before treatment,
only counties’ propensity scores change discretely at the critical cutoffs. All other
county-level factors, observable or unobservable, should evolve smoothly with the
running variable, especially at the cutoffs. As a partial test of this assumption,
we can check for discontinuities in the predetermined county characteristics that
might confound our estimates. We systematically test the smoothness of a set of
pre-determined county-level covariates through the eligibility cutoff. The results are
shown in Figure 1.6, which plot average county characteristics against the running
variable. For each variable, we also plot the predicted outcome from regrssion using
the eligibility indicator, a quartic in 1992 income per capita relative to the threshold
as explanatory variables. Generally, the figures indicate that none of the discontinu-
ity estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero, suggesting no clear breaks
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around the cutoff.
The continuity assumption could also be violated in the presence of precise
sorting around the eligibility threshold (McCrary, 2007). According to the insti-
tutional setup, manipulation of this sort should not be expected. In 1994, the
administrator used 1992 data to allocate treatment and the exact poverty lines were
not released until after the data were collected. Figure 1.7 presents a histogram
of the number of counties at each of the 50 bins of 1992 rural income per capita,
suggesting no evidence of nonrandom sorting across the cutoffs.
1.6 Conclusion
This study employs a panel data set to examine the performance of 8-7 Plan,
a poverty alleviation program introduced in the early 1990’s by the Chinese govern-
ment. The program’s placement rule causes a discontinuity in a county’s probability
of treatment as a function of its pre-program per capita income. This feature is ex-
ploited to identify the causal effects of the program on the change in the county’s
per capita income. Based on a regression discontinuity approach, our analysis shows
that the program had a significant positive effect on income growth. This finding
is robust to different model specifications. According to our estimates, the program
increased per capita income gains by around 26 percent in the 1994-2000 period.
This estimated program effect is much larger than that obtained from a conven-
tional difference-in-differences method, which indirectly reveals the important role
of initial endowments in the path towards economic development.
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To examine whether the program has a lasting effect in promoting income
growth, we also estimate the program’s impact on the change in log rural per capita
income during 1994-2003. It turns out that the estimates of the program effect in this
longer time horizon are slightly smaller in size, and also less significant for a number
of model specifications than the “short-run” estimates. This finding suggests that
the 8-7 Plan might only have generated a spurt in rural income that began to decay
shortly after the program was phased out.
Constrained by data availability, our assessment of the 8-7 Plan focuses on
average income growth instead of poverty reduction. The use of county-level data
also prevents us from depicting the program’s distributional implications. For a
more comprehensive evaluation of the success of the 8-7 Plan, more research is
needed to look at these dimensions of the program effect.
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Chapter 2
Prenatal Sex Selection and Missing Girls in China: Evidence from
the Diffusion of Diagnostic Ultrasound
2.1 Introduction
China has a significant population sex imbalance in favor of males. It has been
estimated that tens of millions of Chinese women are “missing” (Coale, 1991; Sen,
1990, 1992). Sen (1992) suggested that a substantial excess female mortality due to
sex discrimination was responsible for the huge deficit of females in China. Since
then, the issue of “missing women” has received great attention from researchers
and policy makers alike. The problem undoubtedly needs to be addressed because
of its profound ethical implications for women’s welfare (Croll, 2000). In addition,
concerns have also been raised about the adverse social consequences of the huge
surplus of men (Ebenstein and Jennings, 2008; Edlund et al., 2007).
The recent years have seen a worsening of the “missing women” problem in
China as the ratio of male to female births continued to rise significantly. As re-
ported in the censuses, the sex ratio1 of the population age 0, which was 107.6 in
1982, has reached 117.8 in 2000. The rapid rise in the sex ratio at birth coincided
with the introduction of the One Child Policy, and the increased access to fetal sex
determination technologies, chiefly diagnostic ultrasound. Previous research sug-
1Throughout the paper, sex ratio is defined as the number of males per 100 females.
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gests that the rising sex ratio at birth in China was mainly a result of the escalating
incidence of sex-selective abortion (Banister, 2004; Chu, 2001; Miller, 2001).2
Existing empirical analysis based on large samples has generally attempted to
infer indirect evidence of sex-selective abortion in China from sex ratio differentials
by birth order, and by sex composition of older sibling(s). Specifically, the previ-
ous literature finds that the sex ratio at birth is close to the natural rate (roughly
106) for first births, but increases steeply with parity following lower order female
births (Zeng et al., 1993; Das Gupta, 2005; Ebenstein, forthcoming). This empirical
regularity recovered from both fertility surveys and censuses is certainly consistent
with the hypothesis that sex selection is responsible for the shortage of girls.3 How-
ever, no previous research has presented direct evidence of sex-selective abortion or
quantified its impact on the sex ratio at birth in China.
This paper aims to provide more convincing evidence on the importance of sex-
selective abortion on the sex ratio at birth in China. A major obstacle to empirical
research in this line is that sex-selective abortion depends on both the demand for
sons by parent and the supply of the technology that facilitates the practice. In
this paper, I construct a unique data set that tracks the differential diffusion of
2Oster (2005) argued that the high prevalence of Hepatitis B can explain up to 75% of the
female deficit in China. Lin and Luoh (2008), using a huge medical data set from Taiwan, showed
that the virus can raise the probability of having a son only very slightly. In a recent study, Oster
et al. (2008) claimed that there is no link between Hepatitis B status and the sex ratio at birth in
China.
3A similar pattern of male-biased sex ratio is found among US-born children of Chinese and
Asian-Indian parents by Almond and Edlund (2008) and Abrevaya (forthcoming).
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diagnostic ultrasound in China, thus obtaining variation in the access to prenatal
sex determination technology that is plausibly orthogonal to demand factors. This
data set identifies the year in which ultrasound machines were introduced into each
of the roughly 1,500 counties from many issues of Local Gazetteer, a form of Chinese
local history. This data set is then matched with a comprehensive microdata set
that contains more than 500,000 live births in China from 1975 to 1992, a time of
rapid expansion in ultrasound access. The birth records in the microdata allow an
accurate measure of sex ratio at birth that is necessary for the analysis of prenatal
sex selection.4
To estimate the effect of access to selective abortion on the sex ratio at birth
in China, I use a difference-in-differences (DD) approach that exploits plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in the timing of ultrasound adoption across counties. During the
period under study, induced abortion was legal, and abortion services were provided
in public health facilities throughout China in the same way as other medical pro-
cedures. Therefore, the access to sex-selective abortion depended crucially on the
availability of the ultrasound capable of prenatal sex determination. Because ultra-
sound technology entered different Chinese counties at different times, women who
became pregnant after the introduction of ultrasound should have better knowl-
edge of the fetal sex than those who became pregnant prior to the introduction
of ultrasound. As such, the effects of better access to sex-selective abortion can
4The use of sex ratio of the cohort age 0 based upon population census, for example, runs the
risk of misclassifying neonatal sex selection as prenatal sex selection, thus an overestimation of the
latter.
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be estimated by comparing changes in sex ratio at birth for counties that adopted
ultrasound relative to those that had not yet adopted it.
I find that the adoption of ultrasound technology has significant effects on the
sex ratio at birth in China. My most credible estimates imply that on average, the
introduction of ultrasound increases the probability of a male birth by 1.3 percent-
age points for second order births, and by 2.4 percentage points for third or higher
order births in a county. I also find that, if there were no previous sons, having
local access to ultrasound raises the male probability by 4.8 percentage points for
second births, and by 6.8 percentage points for third births. I interpret these find-
ings as showing clear evidence of prenatal sex selection in China during the period
under consideration. All results are robust to various controls, including mother
characteristics and pregnancy characteristics.
The expansion of ultrasound coincided with a period when the Chinese pop-
ulation was under strict fertility regulations, commonly known as the One Child
Policy. Earlier work suggests that the One Child Policy has been an important con-
tributing factor for the high sex ratio in China (Ebenstein, forthcoming; Edlund et
al., 2007). In addition, the enforcement of the policy is known to be highly localized
and varying over time (Greenhalgh, 1986; Short and Zhai, 1998; Scharping, 2003;
Gu et al., 2007). To account for potential correlation between ultrasound adoption
and the temporal and regional variation in the implementation of the One Child
Policy, I use the yearly birth rate at the county level as proxy for the intensity of
population controls.5 My main results are not affected by the inclusion of birth rate
5Birth rate is expected to be lower under tighter enforcement of the One Child Policy.
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as an additional control variable. Consistent with previous studies, I find that the
sex ratios are more skewed toward males in areas with more stringent fertility poli-
cies. Furthermore, results from the specification that allows the effects of ultrasound
to vary with the degree of policy enforcement imply that the observed increase in
sex ratio at birth in China since the 1980s was mainly a result of the interaction of
the One Child Policy and the diffusion of ultrasound technology.
A number of robustness checks support the key identifying assumption that
the timing of ultrasound’s entry is uncorrelated with differential trends in sex ratios.
First, I include the interaction of linear time trends with county pre-treatment
variables to account for possible differential trends across counties. I find that
my basic results are not affected. Second, I show that the change in sex ratio at
birth is not correlated with future ultrasound access. Furthermore, the event study
analysis that allows for differential effects before, during, and after the adoption
of ultrasound also confirms that there are no preexisting differential trends in the
sex ratio at birth in counties with and without ultrasound, and that the increase
in male fraction among high order births is closely aligned with the introduction of
ultrasound.
My final set of results addresses heterogeneity in the effects of ultrasound on
birth gender. I find that the estimates of the average effect of ultrasound are driven
mainly by individuals from the three largest ethnic groups in China, while the effects
on smaller ethnic groups are small and statistically insignificant. I also find that the
introduction of ultrasound results in a more skewed sex ratio for second and higher
order births in urban areas relative to rural areas. Finally, my results also suggest
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that prenatal sex selection in China is more prevalent among the less-educated
population.
This study contributes to efforts to understand the exact cause of the sex
imbalance in China, which has the largest population in the world. To the best
of my knowledge, my analysis is the first to show that the rise of the sex ratio at
birth since the early 1980s was caused, in part, by prenatal sex selection that was
made possible by the diffusion of diagnostic ultrasound across China. Moreover,
by showing that prenatal sex selection tended to be more prevalent under tougher
fertility control, this paper also is in accordance with the previous studies that
stress the important role of the One Child Policy in the rise in sex ratio in China
(Ebenstein, forthcoming; Edlund et al., 2007).
Somewhat further afield, the findings in this paper may also be relevant for
studies of the costs and benefits of technological advances in medical care (see, for
example, Newhouse, 1992; Cutler and McClellan, 2001; Cutler, 2007). Previous
studies have examined the monetary cost of medical innovation. For the first time,
this paper provides an example of how the introduction of a new technology can
lead to biased sex ratios that can have substantial social costs when the technology
is misused for purposes other than health care.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides back-
ground on the motivation for sex selection in China and how this selection may
be achieved through sex-selective abortion. Section 3 describes the empirical strat-
egy. Section 4 discusses the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5
reports the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 The Motivation Behind Sex Selection in China
China has a long history of son preference. The concept of male superiority
is part of the Confucian values that are deeply rooted in Chinese culture. This tra-
dition stresses the importance of continuing the family line through male offspring,
and thereby reinforcing male dominance within a household. These values shaped
marriage patterns and family structures that were strictly patriarchal.
In a patriarchal family, sons are also valued more than daughters for economic
reasons.6 Daughters are usually lost to their natal family after marriage. Sons,
however, normally stay with their parents and are expected to provide labor for
the farm or family business. Parents also have to depend on their sons for old-age
support, because of the absence of well-functioning social insurance programs as in
industrialized countries.
Son preference has profoundly shaped the childbearing and rearing behaviors
in China. During the time when average fertility was high, parents rarely stopped
having more children before the desired number of sons were reached.7 However,
the national family planning program in China, enacted in 1979 and commonly
known as the One Child Policy, changed the picture dramatically. In essence, the
stringent birth control policy placed a legal limit on the family size, which prevented
6Qian (2008) showed that a rise in the value of female labor improves the survival rates for girls
in China.
7Gender specific stopping rule (Dahl and Moretti, 2008) per se is different from sex selection,
and will not cause the imbalance in sex ratio itself.
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individuals from having multiple births to ensure the birth of a son (or sons). The
opportunity cost of having another child of unwanted sex increased substantially.
As a consequence, son preference manifests itself through sex-selection practices,
which can be performed either prenatally or postnatally. Female infanticide, neglect
of baby girls, and preferential allocation of key household resources to sons fall into
the category of postnatal sex-selection strategies. Prenatal sex selection, however,
was made possible only recently by new technologies.
2.2.2 Abortion in China
Prenatal sex selection is usually done in the form of sex-selective abortion
(Edlund, 1999).8 The practice of sex-selective abortion requires that two conditions
be met. First, the technology must be available to reveal the sex of the fetus.
Second, women need to have access to abortion facilities following the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. In this subsection, I briefly describe abortion law (policies)
and practices in China.
In contemporary China, abortion was legalized in 1953. Until 1957, however,
legal abortions were permitted only when continuation of the pregnancy was med-
ically undesirable, when the spacing of childbirth was too close, or when a woman
had difficulty in breastfeeding the previous child. Even in such cases, abortions
were not allowed without the certification from a physician and the approval of the
couples’ work units. In 1957, legal access to abortion was made easier as part of
the China’s early efforts to curb its population growth. In principle, abortions were
8Sex selection prior to conception, such as sperm sorting, does not require induced abortions.
30
available only upon request to any married woman within ten weeks of conception,
and an abortion could only be performed once a year. In 1979, the One Child
Policy was announced. Abortion became an essential component of this birth con-
trol campaign, and restrictions on abortion were relaxed accordingly. All reference
to abortion was omitted from the Criminal Code of China of 1979 (Savage, 1988;
Rigdon, 1996). The number of abortions grew rapidly after the introduction of the
One Child Policy. In 1983, a national campaign was launched that included manda-
tory abortion for pregnancies exceeding the quotas stipulated by the Policy (Simon,
1988).
In China, abortion services were provided in government health facilities in the
same way that other health services are provided during this time. Early abortions
are usually performed by a qualified medical personnel using vacuum aspiration.
Second-trimester abortions are performed in a hospital by a physician. Abortions are
free, and the woman undergoing the procedure would also be rewarded by paid leave
of up to 30 days.9 Although most abortions are carried out during early pregnancy,
the government allows abortions to be done up to six months of gestation (Hepburn
and Simon, 2007). During the period under study, abortion was a frequent form of
birth control in areas where access to contraception was limited and failure rates
were high. Under the One Child Policy, abortions of above-quota pregnancies were
encouraged, if not forced, by the Chinese government. In addition, the Chinese
population at large is permissive toward abortion, thanks to the lack of a strong
9Therefore those who had abortions, except the unmarried women, would have an incentive to
report them.
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religious tradition (Rigdon, 1996). Therefore, the feasibility of prenatal sex selection
hinged crucially on the access to prenatal sex determination technologies.
2.2.3 Ultrasound and Prenatal Sex Selection
While there exist a variety of reliable diagnostic procedures for fetal sex deter-
mination, ultrasound examination is used most frequently in China because it is the
least expensive and most easily accessible method.10 Ultrasound-B machines were
originally designed for diagnostic purposes such as monitoring fetal development and
checking intrauterine device placement. Ultrasound examination is also capable of
prenatal sex identification, based on direct visualization of the external genitalia
of the developing fetus. The accuracy of the technique is substantially improved
from 15 to 16 weeks of gestation onwards.11 With the recent development of high-
resolution ultrasound equipment, and with the advent of transvaginal sonography
(TVS), a diagnosis (although relatively inaccurate) can be made even as early as
11 weeks (Whitlow et al., 1999; Efrat et al., 1999). Most, if not all, of the obstetric
ultrasound scans in China in the study period were by transabdominal sonography
(TAS), and the lower-resolution equipment hindered accurate fetal sex determina-
tion in early pregnancy. The diagnostic procedure of ultrasound scan is painless and
safe, with results immediately available at the time of visit. More importantly, the
service is relatively inexpensive and readily affordable by any ordinary household.
10Other modern methods of prenatal sex determination include chorionic villous sampling, am-
niocentesis, hematological tests, and so on.
11For a review of the medical literature on this subject, see, for example, Mielke et al. (1998).
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In China, it has been the most prevalent form of prenatal sex determination since
its introduction.
In 1979, China was able to manufacture its very first ultrasound-B machine.
Since the early 1980s, large numbers of imported and Chinese-made ultrasound
machines have been introduced into the market. By 1987, the number of ultrasound-
B machines being used in hospitals and clinics was estimated to exceed 13,000,
or roughly six machines per county. According to official records, the number of
imported ultrasound machines peaked in the late 1980s; over 2,000 state-of-the-
art color ultrasound machines were imported in 1989 alone. It was also estimated
that in the early 1990s, China had the capacity to produce over 10,000 machines
annually, the equivalent of four additional machines per year for each county. By
the mid-1990s, all county hospitals and clinics, as well as most township clinics and
family planning service stations, were equipped with ultrasound devices that could
be used for prenatal sex identification (Chu, 2001).
The popularization of ultrasound has made sex selection easier. Concurrent
with the rapid growth of access to ultrasound, China witnessed an unprecedented
rise in the sex ratio at birth during the 1980s (Chu, 2001). In 1989, having realized
the potential disastrous consequences of the abuse of this technology, the Chinese
government outlawed fetal sex determination for non-medical purposes and legis-
lated substantial penalties for physicians performing such tests. The government
regulations, however, proved ineffectual in practice. The misuse of ultrasound was
often hard to police, and doctors continued to do so as a favor to relatives, friends,
or people who paid bribes (Zeng et al., 1993). In addition, the problem was made
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worse by the incentive structure under the One Child Policy. After all, the local offi-
cials who were pressed to meet the birth planning targets that emphasized solely the
number of births would rather turn a blind eye at the use of sex-selective abortions
than pay the consequences of missing their targets.
Evidence suggests that China’s sex ratio at birth has been increasing with the
use of abortion, as shown in Figure 2.1. The upper line is the time series of the
sex ratio at birth at the national level from 1978 to 1990, and the lower line is the
time series of the abortion ratio12 at the national level. While the co-movement of
the two variables is consistent with an effect of sex-selective abortion on the sex
ratio at birth, the extent to which these abortions were performed for sex-selective
purposes remains unclear. Figure 2.2 plots the abortion ratio versus sex ratio at
birth based on data of pregnancies aggregated into pregnancy-year × pregnancy-
order cells. It shows that for all the fetuses conceived in the same year and of
the same pregnancy order, the higher the abortion ratio, the higher the sex ratio of
live births. This finding provides clear evidence of sex-selective abortions during this
period. Notably, the positive correlation is driven mostly by second and higher-order
pregnancies. The abortion ratio and the sex ratio at birth of the first pregnancies,
however, are both stable over the years (clustered in the lower left corner of the
panel).
12Abortion ratio is defined as the proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion.
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2.3 Empirical Approach
I exploit variation in the year that ultrasound was introduced in each county
to estimate the effect of access to sex-selective abortion on the probability of having
a male birth. The time of conception and the county of residence jointly determine
the mother’s exposure to ultrasound technology.
To investigate the differential impacts of ultrasound technology on the proba-
bility of the birth being a male child across birth orders, I first estimate the following
linear probability model using the sample of all births:
Boyict = β1(1st× ultrasoundct) + β2(2nd× ultrasoundct) + β3(3rd+ × ultrasoundct)
+ β4 2nd + β5 3rd
+ + Xictγ + µc + νt + εict (2.1)
Here i indexes individual birth, c indexes county, and t indexes year. The dependent
variable Boyict is a binary variable which equals one if the birth is male. 1st, 2nd
and 3rd+ are indicator variables for the first birth, the second birth, and the third
or higher parity birth. Positive β4 and β5 values imply that the offspring in higher
birth orders are more likely to be male. ultrasoundct is a dummy variable indicating
whether ultrasound technology has been introduced into county c in year t, when
the mother became pregnant. If the incentive for sex selection grows with family
size, one would expect ultrasound to have a more pronounced effect on higher order
births. To test this hypothesis, I interact the ultrasound variable with birth order
indicators, allowing for differential effects of ultrasound by birth order.13 Xict is a
13It is possible that people with really strong preference for sons would travel to neighboring
counties to get ultrasound scanning for sex selection. This spillover effect may lead to an underes-
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vector of controls for ethnicity, maternal education, maternal age, and its square
term, gestational age and information on prenatal care that might affect the likeli-
hood of a male birth. µc is a vector of county of birth dummies and νt a vector of
year of conception dummies.
It should be recognized that the county by year variation in local ultrasound
access is certainly not random. The more urbanized areas tended to adopt ultra-
sound earlier.14 The underlying factors that drove the introduction of ultrasound
could lead to spurious estimates if those same county characteristics are associated
with differential trends in sex ratios. To account for possible differences in trends
that might be correlated with the timing of ultrasound adoption, I include the in-
teraction between “pre-treatment” county characteristics, Z80c , with a linear time
trend, and also the triple interaction terms between county variables, linear time
trend, and birth order indicators. Specifically, using the sample for counties that
adopted ultrasound technology after 1980, I estimate the following model:
Boyict = β1(1st× ultrasoundct) + β2(2nd× ultrasoundct) + β3(3rd+ × ultrasoundct)
+ (Z80c × t) θ1 + (Z 80c × t× 2nd) θ2 + (Z 80c × t× 3rd+) θ3
+ β4 2nd + β5 3rd
+ + Xictγ + µc + νt + εict (2.2)
My second strategy explores whether the effect of ultrasound varies with sex
composition of previous sibling(s). Using samples restricted to second or third
timation of the true effect of the local access to ultrasound.
14In results not shown, I find that the technology was first introduced to counties with large
population and a higher level of electricity consumption per capita.
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births, I run regressions of the following form:
Boyict = π1 noboy + π2 ultrasoundct + π3 (noboy × ultrasoundct)
+ Xictγ + µc + νt + εict (2.3)
where noboy is an indicator that equals one if the mother had no son(s). A positive
π1 indicates that mothers with daughters are more likely to give birth to sons.
Moreover, if those families with no older boy(s) are more interested in sex selection,
one would expect the technology to have a larger effect on births without male elder
sibling(s). Therefore I hypothesize that π3 > 0. A same set of control variables are
included as in Equation (1).
The above specification gives no sense of the dynamic effect of ultrasound
adoption on the sex ratio at birth, that is, how fast local sex ratios would respond
to the adoption of ultrasound, and whether the effect accelerates, stabilizes, or
fades as time passes. Moreover, the examination of the pattern of anticipatory
effects provides a useful specification check. If the rise in sex ratios was truly driven
by the availability of ultrasound, one should not observe any growth in sex ratios
before the introduction of ultrasound. To fully investigate the dynamics described
above, I augment the statistical model with leads and lags of the implied ultrasound
adoption, thereby allowing for anticipatory effects and lagged effects of ultrasound.
Moreover, I interact the leads and lags of ultrasound with birth order indicators to
allow these effects to vary with birth orders. Specifically, I fit the model of the form:













+ Xictγ + µc + νt + εict (2.4)
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where Dτct is an indicator variable for the number of years before or after the county’s
adoption of ultrasound. τ indexes the time relative to ultrasound adoption. Accord-
ingly, I let Dτct = 1 if, in year t, ultrasound device has been introduced into county
c for τ years (or, for a negative τ , county c adopted ultrasound −τ years later).15
In Equation (4), the dummy variables, Dτct, τ = −2,−1, 0, 1, · · · , 5 jointly represent
the event of ultrasound adoption in county c.16 In particular, δτ (or λτ ) is the pa-
rameter giving the effect of local access to ultrasound on the fraction of male birth
in the county τ years following its adoption of ultrasound for first (or second and
higher order) births. The coefficients are measured relative to the omitted coefficient
(τ < −2). In addition, the event study model includes a birth order indicator, a
vector of time-varying characteristics of the birth, and unrestricted fixed effects for
county and year.
2.4 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
This paper makes use of two primary data sets. The first is a microdata set
from the Chinese Children Survey, which was conducted by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China in June 1992. Funding and support for this project was provided
by the United Nations Children’s Fund, the Ministry of Education of China, the
Ministry of Health of China, and the All-China Women’s Federation. The original
purpose of the survey was to study child welfare in China. This is a large and
representative sample of 560,000 households and two million individuals (including
15Alternatively, Dτct = 1 if county c adopted ultrasound in year τ − k.
16D5ct is equal to one if in every year beginning with the fifth year adopting ultrasound.
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children, their parents, and other family members) throughout China.
What makes this survey well suited for my analysis is the pregnancy history
form for all women who have ever been pregnant since 1976. The qualified re-
spondents were asked questions regarding each pregnancy. Each pregnancy record
contains information on the pregnancy order, approximate time of conception, use of
prenatal care, gestation length, and its final outcome (miscarriage, induced abortion,
live birth, and others). For live births, gender and date of birth are also recorded.
The mother identifier ensures accurate matching of a given mother’s births and
their respective parities, which is extremely useful for my analysis. One of the key
variables for identifying in utero ultrasound “exposure” is the year of conception.
The data provide the year of conception and the exact date of birth of each child.
For about 1% of the sample, the reported year of birth is either earlier or two years
later than the reported year of conception. In this case, I use the reported gesta-
tion length and year of birth to infer the conception year to minimize measurement
error.17
My analysis is confined to the sample of children born in and after 1975.
The main sample contains about 600,000 pregnancies and 500,000 live births. The
summary statistics are described in Table 2.1. About 13% of the pregnancies were
17Unlike administrative data, self-reported are potentially inaccurate when respondents have
difficulty recalling events from their past, in my case their pregnancy histories. We expect that
the measurement error to have only minimal effect on the main results, because the reported
measure used to construct my key explanatory variable, the local access to ultrasound, is the year
of conception.
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terminated in induced abortion. Around 84% of the pregnancies resulted in births.
Abount 53% of the births are boys. The implied sex ratio at birth is 113, well above
the biological norm of 105 boys per 100 girls. To illustrate the increasing trend of
sex ratios during the period under consideration, Figure 2.3, based on my sample
of births, provides a plot of the time series of sex ratios at birth broken down by
birth order.18 During the late 1970s, there is no observable difference in sex ratios
across birth order. Since the early 1980s, sex ratios for different birth orders begin
to diverge. As is evident from the figure, there is a systematic ordering of the sex
ratios across parities, with more elevated sex ratios among higher order births. The
sex ratios at birth at parity two and above experienced a steady climb during the
1980s, while for first births the sex ratio was relatively stable over time and closer
to the biological norm. Figure 2.4 provides time-series plots of the sex ratios for
second and third births, respectively, conditional upon sex composition of previous
child(ren). Panel (a) of Figure 2.4 gives sex ratios for second and third births with
no older male sibling(s). Panel (b) shows sex ratios for second and third births
with older male sibling(s). In both panels, sex ratios for first births are included
for comparison. There appears to be a striking difference between sex ratios of
birth with or without older brothers. It clearly shows that the sex imbalance at
birth during this period comes almost entirely from higher order births following
daughters. Throughout the time period shown, the sex ratio of births with older
male sibling(s) is stable over time and not significantly different from the sex ratio
18Sex ratios for years before 1978 are not reported because the number of observations for higher
order births is below 500.
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of first births.
The second data set documents the timing of county-level ultrasound adop-
tion. This information is collected by combing many volumes of Local Gazetteer.
The Chinese Government has a long tradition, lasting over one thousand years, of
publishing issues of Local Gazetteer from time to time to record the development
in a certain locality, typically a province, a city, or a county. Local Gazetteer is a
copious official publication that embraces all types of information concerning his-
tory, economy, administration, culture, development, and so on. As such, it is often
regarded as the authoritative encyclopedia of various particular locations in China.
In the early 1980s, the age-old tradition was revived when a new collection
of Local Gazetteers were published to reflect the dramatic social changes that had
taken place since the last major revision in the 1920s. Each local government set up
its own Local Gazetteer Compilation Committee and performed a systematic review
of its jurisdiction in a host of areas. A volume of Local Gazetteer was published
as the final product of this bureaucratic effort. The new Local Gazetteers usually
do not have a uniform framework in general, but most contain a chapter on public
health issues. In this chapter, the time of the introduction of ultrasound machines
was often recorded as a remarkable achievement in the public health sector for many
counties.
The geographic distribution of counties with ultrasound over time is illustrated
by a series of maps of China (see Figure 2.5), where the counties that had the
ultrasound device between 1980 and 1995 are represented by areas shaded in dark
blue, compared to areas where ultrasound was not yet available, which are denoted
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with light blue shading.19 It appears that the technology expansion did not follow
any clear geographic pattern (for example, from the coast to interior areas). Figure
2.6 tabulates the cumulative percentage of counties that had adopted ultrasound in
each year in my data set. A few counties started to have ultrasound machines as
early as 1965 (not shown in the figure). The coverage increased relatively slowly
during the 1970s. Since the early 1980s, the expansion accelerated. In 1985 alone,
over 500 counties adopted ultrasound, and the fraction of counties with ultrasound
devices more than doubled. Virtually all the counties had their own ultrasound
equipment by the end of the 1980s. This tabulation indicates that my microdata
span a period of rapid diffusion of ultrasound technology.
Figure 2.7 plots the sex ratios at birth classified by birth orders, and by local
access to ultrasound. Each set of two bars shows the sex ratios for first births, second
births, and third and higher order births. For each birth order group, I compare the
sex ratios of births with local access to ultrasound to the sex ratios of those who
had no access to ultrasound in their counties of birth.20 I use the delta method to
derive standard errors of sample sex ratios, based on which 95% confidence intervals
are calculated (represented by error bars around the sample mean). The underlying
sample size is provided at the bottom of each bar. The figure demonstrates that
the sex ratio at birth increases with birth order, with sex ratio slightly higher than
the biological norm among first births. For first births, the sex ratio varies only
19Grey shaded areas are counties for which the information on ultrasound adoption is unavailable.
20A live birth is classified as having local access to ultrasound if ultrasound-B machines had
been introduced into the county when the mother was pregnant.
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slightly with local ultrasound access. The sex ratio at birth at parity one is 107.2
when ultrasound is unavailable, compared to 108.7 when local access to ultrasound
is available. However, the increase in sex ratios for second and higher order births
is evident after the adoption of ultrasound: the average sex ratio increases from
113.2 to 121.2 for second births, and from 118.6 to 132.4 for third and higher order
births. In addition, the data strongly refute the null hypothesis that the difference
in sex ratios of second births (or third and higher order births) is zero. I interpret
these findings as preliminary evidence of prenatal sex selection among higher order
births when parents have local access to fetal sex determination technology, although
formal regression analysis is needed to account for potential omitted variable biases.
Finally, I supplement the above two data sets with control variables from
other sources. A list of 1980 county characteristics is taken from the Chinese Com-
pendium of Economic Statistics by County. These data are employed to measure
“pre-treatment” county variables for use as potential determinants of the date of
ultrasound adoption after 1980. In particular, I construct log population, farmland
area per capita, sown area per capita, grain and meat production per capita, agricul-
tural machinery power per capita, fertilizer use per capita, and power consumption
per capita in 1980 for each county.
2.5 Results
The reported estimates in this section are from linear probability regressions,
where the independent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the birth
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is male. The linear probability models are useful for my purpose since the fitted
probabilities are very close to 50%. Probit estimation produces nearly identical
results. Standard errors are adjusted for serial correlation by clustering at the
county level.
2.5.1 Sex Ratio at Birth by Parity
I first explore how the probability of the birth being male differs across birth
parity. I start by including only the birth order indicators (with first births being
the omitted category) as the explanatory variables in the first column of Table 2.2.
In the next column, I add in a set of mother- and pregnancy-specific covariates that
could potentially affect the likelihood of a male birth. The mother level controls
are the mother’s ethnicity (Han vs. ethnic minorities), education, a quadratic in
maternal age at conception. Pregnancy characteristics include gestation length and
indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits. Additional controls, including
the year (of conception) effects and county fixed effects, are added sequentially in
Columns (3)-(4). The coefficients of the birth order indicators should be interpreted
as the difference in male probability of higher order births from first births. The
estimates of the birth order effects are positive and statistically significant at the
1% level, and neither the point estimates nor the standard errors are much affected
by the inclusion of additional controls. In my preferred specification that has the
richest set of controls (the last column of Table 2.2), the estimates imply that second
births are 2.1 percentage points more likely to be male than first births, while third
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and higher order births are 4.1 percentage points more likely to be male than first
order births. My results so far are consistent with the empirical regularity found
in censuses and other fertility surveys that the sex ratio in China tends to increase
with birth order. I interpret the male bias at higher parity in my birth data as
suggestive evidence of prenatal sex selection, whereas the next subsection explores
the question more directly.
2.5.2 The Effect of Ultrasound Availability on Male Probability by
Birth Order
In this subsection, I estimate the effect of ultrasound on the probability of a
male birth, allowing this effect to vary by birth parity. Since I only have information
on ultrasound for a subset of the administrative units in China, the sample size
is reduced accordingly in the following analysis. Results are reported from the
estimation of Equation (1).
In the first column of Table 2.3, I present the results from the most parsi-
monious specification with only the birth order indicators, the interactions between
ultrasound availability, and a full set of birth order indicators as independent vari-
ables. The coefficient on the interaction ultrasound and first-birth indicator is pos-
itive but very small in size and not statistically different from zero, which implies
that having access to ultrasound is not associated with any significant change in
sex ratio of first births. The coefficients of the interactions between ultrasound and
higher birth order indicators, however, are both positive and highly significant. The
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estimates suggest that after the introduction of ultrasound, the probability of male
births increased by 2.0 percentage points for second births, and by 3.0 percentage
points for third and higher order births. It is also worth noting that a qualitatively
similar pattern of birth order main effects is found even in the absence of local
access to ultrasound, albeit with a smaller magnitude. This implies that prenatal
sex selection was not impossible, but certainly more costly, before ultrasound was
introduced into the mother’s county of residence.
In Column (2), results are reported for a regression specification that controls
for observed individual heterogeneity. A similar set of individual control variables
are added as in the previous table. The estimates of birth order indicators, as well as
their interactions with ultrasound, are largely insensitive to the inclusion of the set
of individual covariates. The results also suggest an imprecise zero impact of ultra-
sound on male probability of first births. The next column adds county fixed effects
in the regression model, which eliminates potential bias in the previous estimates
that are attributable to time-invariant omitted factors that vary across counties.
Again, the estimates are very robust to this adjustment. In the remaining column
in Table 2.3, I further include unrestricted year fixed effects to the preceding specifi-
cation. The year effects absorb aggregate shocks to sex ratio at birth that might be
correlated with ultrasound adoption. This exercise leads to only minimal decreases
in the coefficients on the interaction between ultrasound and second and higher
birth order indicators. The estimates suggest that the local access of ultrasound
increased the fraction of boys by 1.3 percentage points for second births, and by
2.4 percentage points for third and higher order births. Both of the coefficients are
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significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the estimated effect of ultrasound on gender
of first births is close to zero and not statistically significant at the 5% level.
Overall, my estimates suggest that the introduction of ultrasound has a posi-
tive effect on the male birth likelihood among second births, and a more pronounced
positive effect on third and higher order births. The effect of ultrasound on sex of
first births is small and statistically insignificant.
2.5.3 The Effect of Ultrasound on Male Probability Conditional on
Sex of Previous Child(ren)
In this subsection, I examine whether the impact of ultrasound on sex ra-
tio varies with the sex composition of previous child(ren) using the specification
described in Equation (3).
Table 2.4 presents the results for the sample of second births. In Column (1),
the regression includes an indicator that equals one if the first birth is female, the
ultrasound availability, and their interaction term as explanatory variables. The
regression shows that the second birth’s gender depends on the firstborn’s gender.
When the first child is a girl, the second birth is 3.5 percentage points more likely
to be a boy. More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction term between
ultrasound and firstborn girl indicator is positive and highly significant. The point
estimate implies that if there was no previous son, having local access to ultrasound
raises the male probability by 4.7 percentage points among second births. The main
effect of ultrasound is negative but insignificant at conventional levels. To probe the
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robustness of these results, I gradually add in a set of individual control variables,
county fixed effects, and year effects in Columns (2)-(4). The coefficients on the
previous gender indicator and its interaction with ultrasound are extremely robust
to the covariate adjustments. Interestingly, in the last specification, the main effect
of ultrasound is found to be negative and significant at the 10% level, although with
a relatively small magnitude.
Table 2.5 displays the results for the sample of third births. Analogous to
the second births analysis, I now investigate how ultrasound affects the sex ratio of
third births conditional on the sex composition of previous children. The estimates
show that in general, the third birth is more likely to be a boy after two previous
girls. For mothers with two daughters born first, the probability that the third birth
will be male is roughly 8.3 percentage points higher compared with mothers who
already had at least one son. Adjusting for observable characteristics does not alter
the estimated effects substantially. For all specifications, I do not find a consistent
effect of ultrasound on the male probability of children at parity three if the mothers
already had at least one son. However, the interaction effect between ultrasound
and two girls is positive and statistically significant. The point estimate indicate
that for mothers who already had two girls, local ultrasound access increases the
male probability by approximately 6.8 percentage points for third births.
In summary, the results presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that the son-
biased sex ratios at birth at higher parity seem to be solely due to the biased sex
ratio of birth following daughters. It shows that the local access to ultrasound raises
the male probability of subsequent births without older brothers. These findings
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indicate that the male-biased sex ratio of births at higher parities was largely due
to prenatal sex selection motivated by son preference.
2.5.4 The Role of One Child Policy
This subsection investigates the role of China’s One Child Policy in deter-
mining the sex ratio at birth. The existing literature suggests that the One Child
Policy has been an important contributing factor for the high sex ratio in China.
Moreover, the enforcement of the policy was highly localized and varied over time.
One obvious concern about my key identifying assumption is that the timing of the
introduction of ultrasound to Chinese counties may pick up the temporal and spatial
variation in the implementation of the One Child Policy. In the absence of a direct
measure of the local enforcement of the policy, I use the birth rate as a proxy for
the overall intensity of population controls at the county level in each year after the
One Child Policy was introduced.
In the analysis that follows, variation in local family planning policy enforce-
ment is measured as the county-level birth rate during the year when the mother
became pregnant. Birth rate is defined as the number of births divided by the num-
ber of women aged 15-49. The variable is constructed so that it is smaller under
tighter enforcement in county c in year t. For meaningful comparison of estimates
across specifications, the birth rate is normalized as mean 0.
I start by estimating Equation (1), including the birth rate as an additional
covariate to control the county-by-year variation in the implementation of the One
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Child Policy. Furthermore, the birth rate is interacted with the local access to ultra-
sound to examine how the effects of ultrasound differ for loose and strict enforcement
of fertility control. The results are shown in Table 2.6.
Column (1) of the table displays the results from estimating my main equation
using births after 1979, when the One Child Policy was introduced. The estimated
coefficients are very similar to the results from using the whole sample, because the
effects of ultrasound are identified almost entirely from the rapid diffusion of the
technology during the 1980s.
In Column (2), I add the interaction terms of birth rate with birth order
indicators into the regression. The estimated effects of ultrasound are essentially
unchanged, which implies that my baseline model is not simply capturing a spurious
correlation that is confounded by local birth control policies. The coefficients of
the interactions between birth rate and higher order indicators are negative and
significant, suggesting that the higher order births are more likely to be male in
counties with more stringent fertility policies.
In the last column of the table, I further include the regression triple inter-
actions of birth rate, ultrasound, and birth order indicators, allowing the effects of
ultrasound to vary with the intensity of local policy implementation. The coefficients
on the interactions between birth rate and higher birth order indicators are negative
but no longer significant. However, the coefficients on the triple interactions of birth
rate, ultrasound, and birth order indicators are negative and significant at least at
the 10% level. This implies that local ultrasound access has large positive effects on
male probability for higher order births, more so when enforcement of the One Child
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Policy is stricter. In other words, the results sgguest that the observed increase in
sex ratio at birth in China was largely driven by the interaction of the One Child
Policy and the access to ultrasound technology.
To more clearly see the effects of ultrasound on child gender with strong,
medium, and weak enforcement of the One Child Policy, I calculate the ultrasound
effects at 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile values of the birth rate. To
find the ultrasound effects at 25th percentile of the birth rate, for example, I re-run
the regression, in which I replace the birth rate with [birth rate − P25(birth rate)].
This yields, as the new coefficients on ultrasound indicators, the estimated effects
of ultrasound at 25th percentile of the birth rate, along with their standard errors.
The same approach is applied to obtain the effects of ultrasound at median and 75th
percentile value of the birth rate. The estimation results are presented in Table 2.7.
I begin by examining the effects of ultrasound access under strict enforcement
of the One Child Policy. Column (1) of the table presents the estimated impact
of ultrasound on child gender at 25th percentile of the birth rate. At this level,
I estimate a 1.5 percentage points increase in the probability of being male for
second births and a 2.6 percentage points increase for third (and above) births as
a result of ultrasound adoption. Both of the estimates are significant at the 1%
level. In Column (2), I examine the effects of ultrasound under a medium level of
enforcement. For the median birth rate, having ultrasound increased the probability
of being male for second births by 0.9 percentage point, and increased the probability
of being male for third (and above) births by 2.0 percentage points. The last column
presents the estimates of the effects of ultrasound under weak enforcement of the
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Policy. The estimated effects of access to ultrasound around 75th percentile of the
birth rate are quantitatively smaller and not statistically significant at conventional
levels. Overall, these results suggest that the observed effect of ultrasound on child
gender is predominantly a result of prenatal sex selection in areas under tougher
enforcement of birth control when the One Child Policy was effective.
2.5.5 Robustness
In this subsection, I perform several checks on the robustness of the above
results, which are presented in Table 2.8.
One major empirical concern of my difference-in-differences results is the pos-
sibility that trends in some county-level variables are driving both the introduction
of ultrasound and the change in sex ratios. I first use the method described in
Equation (2) to account for possible differential trends in the outcome by observ-
able county factors. Specifically, I include in the regression the interaction between
county “pre-treatment” characteristics and a linear time trend, together with the
triple interaction terms between county variables, linear trend, and birth order indi-
cators. The available Chinese county-level information was unavailable until 1980,
which means I have to exclude all counties that adopted ultrasound before 1980.
For comparison, Column (1) in Table 2.6 displays the results from re-estimating
equation (1) using observations from counties that adopted ultrasound after 1980.
Column (2) contains the results from estimating Equation (2), which shows that
controlling for 1980 county characteristics interacted with a linear time trend does
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not change the main results in any appreciable way.
There remains a concern that the differential trends might be correlated with
ultrasound access in a way that linear trends based on initial values of observable
county variables do not capture. To test for the possibility of preexisting trends more
directly, I include an indicator for getting ultrasound next year into the regression. If
the unobservables that affect both ultrasound access and sex ratio evolve gradually
over time, one should see change in sex ratios that “anticipate” getting ultrasound
in the future. For the sake of comparison, Column (3) simply reproduces the re-
sults from Column (4) in Table 2.3. In the next column, an indicator for getting
ultrasound next year, and its interactions with birth order indicators, are added to
the previous specification. Compared with those in the previous column, the results
indicate that the effect of having ultrasound this year is qualitatively unchanged.
More importantly, getting ultrasound one year later does not predict changes in the
probability of having a male birth. As shown in the same column, the coefficients on
“ultrasound next year” and its interactions with birth order indicators are small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant. Overall, the results suggest little evidence
of preexisting trends or “anticipation” effects of access to ultrasound.
2.5.6 Event Study Analysis
Figure 2.8 plots the estimated effects (with 95% confidence intervals around
the point estimates) of the introduction of ultrasound on fraction of male birth from
estimating Equation (4). This model allows for differential effects before, during,
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and after the adoption of ultrasound. Panel (a) depicts δ̂τ ’s, the coefficients of
the interactions of the event year dummy variables and the dummy variable for first
births. To eliminate potential compositional bias, I restrict the sample to a balanced
panel of births for all eight event years to two years before adoption and five years
after, which means that I include only counties that adopt ultrasound between
1976 and 1986. Panel (a) shows the results for first births graphically, suggesting
no significant impact of having ultrasound on the gender of first births prior to,
during, and after the adoption of ultrasound. Panel (b) plots λ̂τ ’s, the coefficients
of the interactions of the event year dummy variables and the dummy variable for
second (and above) births. The coefficients on the interactions of second (and above)
birth dummy and pre-adoption dummies are close to zero and are not statistically
significant at conventional levels. A Wald test of the hypothesis that λ−2 and λ−1
are jointly zero is not rejected by the data (p-value = 0.5697), showing an absence of
a pre-trend in male fraction anticipating ultrasound adoption. I view this finding as
further evidence of the validity of my identification strategy that exploits the sharp
timing of the county-by-county rollout of ultrasound technology. The estimates
show no effect in the year of adoption, which makes sense as it takes time for the
county’s residents to realize the local access to ultrasound and accumulate necessary
knowledge before making use of the technology for sex selection purposes. In the
next year after adoption, the probability of being male for second (and above) births
increases substantially by 2.0 percentage points, after which the effect of ultrasound
continues to grow gradually over the subsequent three years. The increment appears
to flatten out after four years, with a permanently higher probability of around 4.0
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percentage points in the affected counties.
2.5.7 Heterogeneity
The main results of this paper suggest that local access to ultrasound has
significantly positive effects on the probability of a birth being male for second
and higher order births. However, these results provide no information on how
the impacts differ across different types of mothers. The effect of local access to
ultrasound on birth gender is plausibly heterogeneous for several reasons: (1) the
incentive for sex selection can differ across subpopulations due to different levels of
son preference and different types of the One Child Policy they face; and (2) the
knowledge and ability to make use of sex-selection technologies may differ across
groups. In Table 2.9, I investigate whether there is a systematic gradient in the
magnitude of the estimated effects by ethnicity, residency (urban vs. rural), mother’s
education, and household income. Each row of the table presents estimates of the
effects of ultrasound on the male probability for different subgroups by estimating
the model described in Equation (1).
I start by examining whether there are differential effects for different ethnic
groups. The one-child-per-couple policy was initially applied only to the majority
Han Chinese population. Ethic minorities were largely exempted from the one-child
rule, however ethnic groups with a population larger than 10 million, namely Zhuang
and Manchu, were treated on the same footing as the Han (Li and Zhang, 2007).
Columns (1) and (2) show the effects of ultrasound separately by ethnicity. For the
55
three largest ethnic groups (with a population of 10 million and above), Han, Zhuang,
and Manchu, which faced a more stringent fertility control policy, the estimated
coefficients on the interaction of ultrasound with second birth indicator and the
interaction of ultrasound with third (and higher) birth indicator are positive and
highly significant, with magnitudes qualitatively similar to those in the full sample.
For mothers from smaller ethnic groups (with a population less than 10 million),
the point estimates are quantitatively small and statistically indistinguishable from
zero, showing no consistent evidence of prenatal sex selection for this subpopulation.
This finding echoes the earlier research that emphasizes the role of the One Child
Policy in explaining China’s sex imbalance (Ebenstein, forthcoming). However,
this interpretation should be treated with caution as I am unable to rule out the
alternative explanation that people from smaller ethnic groups exhibit a relatively
weaker preference towards sons.
I next examine whether the effects of ultrasound differ between urban and
rural population. This type of heterogeneity could arise if urban households have
stronger incentives for sex selection than rural households due to the urban-rural
difference in fertility policies. Previous studies indicate that the One Child Policy
was more stringent in urban areas than in rural areas (e.g., Zhang and Spencer,
1992). While the one-child rule was strictly imposed on urban couples, rural couples
with a daughter in some provinces were allowed to have a second birth after 1984
(Greenlaugh, 1986). Moreover, the penalties for above-quota births were much
harsher in urban areas than in rural areas (Banister, 1987). Heterogeneity could also
arise if the urban residents have better access to health care than rural residents. If
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a better health care system could lower the cost of prenatal sex selection, one should
observe a more pronounced effect of ultrasound for the urban population. There are
other reasons, however, that rural families are more likely to engage in sex selection.
Male children are desired in rural areas for provision of labor and old-age support
in the absence of a well-functioning social security system. Yet, in urban China, son
preference is less prevalent, thanks to a better social security system in cities. In
Columns (3) and (4), I break the entire sample down by residency type to examine
the rural-urban disparities in sex selection. Since registration status is unobserved
in the data, I have to use mother’s occupation, i.e., peasant vs. non-peasant, to
proxy for rural vs. urban residency. The results indicate that the introduction of
ultrasound leads to a more skewed sex ratio among second and higher order births in
urban areas relative to rural areas. Specifically, the local ultrasound access increases
the male probability by 2.2 percentage points for second births in urban areas, which
is more than double the estimate for rural areas (1.0 percentage point). The urban-
rural difference in the effects for third and higher order births is also sizable (3.8
vs. 2.1 percentage points). Interestingly, the availability of ultrasound reduces the
probability of having a boy at parity one by 1.0 percentage point. The estimate is
statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that some parents in
rural areas may have selectively aborted their first male fetuses to ensure the birth
of a girl at parity one. For rural households that also have a preference for a large
family size, this type of behavior is consistent with the incentive structure created
by the rural fertility policy, as rural couples in some areas were allowed a second
birth if the first birth was a girl. The evidence provided so far supports the claim
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that the desire for sex selection in China was largely shaped by its fertility policy
(Ebenstein, forthcoming).
Another issue that I address in this subsection is whether the effect of ultra-
sound varies with the education level of the women. There are reasons to believe
that a woman’s education may affect her sex-selection behavior. First, women with
higher educational attainment may have better knowledge regarding the practice
of sex-selective abortion. On the other hand, the improvement in female education
would enhance women’s status, thereby reducing the preference for sons. Moreover,
the relative improvement in women’s earning capacity may also decrease the discrim-
ination against girls (Qian, 2008). Previous empirical studies on other countries also
suggest that son preference is negatively correlated with mother’s education level
(e.g., Chung and Das Gupta, 2007). In Columns (5) and (6), I divide the sample
into two subsamples by mother’s education level and re-estimate the model. The
dividing point is the median educational level, six years of schooling, which is equiv-
alent to being a primary school graduate. The results suggest that the introduction
of ultrasound leads to more prenatal sex selection among less-educated mothers.
In particular, local access to ultrasound increases the male probability by 2.4 per-
centage points for second births of less-educated mothers, while the effect is 0.8
percentage point for mothers with more education (6 years and above) and is not
precisely estimated. A similar pattern is found for third and higher order births:
the point estimate for the less-educated sample is almost 2.7 times the estimate for
the better-educated sample (4.0 vs. 1.5 percentage points).
Finally, I investigate how the effects vary by income levels. There are several
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possible reasons for the income gradient in the effects of ultrasound on child gender.
Richer households are less financially constrained; therefore, they have better access
to and better knowledge of prenatal sex-selection technologies. By contrast, there
is empirical evidence showing that the bias against girls may be stronger for poorer
households (Burgess and Zhuang, 2000). In the last two columns, I stratify the
sample by household income. The dividing point is 3340 yuan, the median household
income in 1992.21 According to the split sample analysis, prenatal sex selection
at parity two appears to be more prevalent for households with lower levels of
income, while selection among third (and higher-order) birth is concentrated in
richer households. The mixed results presented here are merely descriptive and
should not be over-interpreted, since household income is correlated with many
household characteristics that may affect the desire for sex selection.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether the worsening of the sex ratio
at birth since the early 1980s in China is due to increased prenatal sex selection. It
does this by using both time and cross-section variation in local access to prenatal
sex determination caused by the differential introduction of diagnostic ultrasound
into Chinese counties during the 1980s. My empirical analysis uses a unique data
set to demonstrate that the increased local access to ultrasound technology led to
a dramatic increase in the sex ratio at birth. The observed effect of ultrasound
21Household income is measured ex post and thus potentially endogenous.
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was driven entirely by an increase in sex ratios of higher order births. The analysis
also shows that the local access to ultrasound has more pronounced effects on the
probability of male birth for higher order births if there are no male older siblings.
These findings, taken together, leave little doubt that the primary explanation for
China’s rising sex ratio at birth since the 1980s is sex-selective abortion, the cost of
which was reduced markedly by the access to ultrasound.
The expansion of ultrasound in China coincided with a period when the One
Child Policy was in effect. Absent a direct measure of the local enforcement of
the policy, I use birth rate to proxy for the overall intensity of population controls
at the county level in each year, and find that the sex ratios at birth were higher
when enforcement of the One Child Policy was tougher. More importantly, I also
show that the impact of One Child Policy on sex ratio at birth for this period was
primarily a result of prenatal sex selection.
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Chapter 3
Son Preference and Early Childhood Investments in China
3.1 Introduction
Does knowledge of fetal gender during pregnancy alter parental investments?
Previous studies have documented differential treatment of baby girls in South and
East Asia (Das Gupta, 1987; Basu, 1989; Burgess and Zhuang, 2000; Pande, 2003;
Borooah, 2004; Mishra et al., 2004; Park and Rukumnuaykit, 2004). To this, we
add a natural experiment in parents’ knowledge of the sex of their child during
pregnancy provided by the roll-out of ultrasound technology across the counties
of China (Meng, 2009). Changes in investments that affect female fetuses are of
concern not only because they can affect health and mortality, but also because they
can impair the later-life health and human capital of females. With prenatal sex
determination, gender biased investments could occur at an earlier and potentially
more-sensitive stage of development. Thus, our research question engages both the
son preference and “fetal origins” literatures.1
Observationally, deliberate sex selection by parents may obscure the effect of
knowing fetal gender on early childhood investments. The diffusion of ultrasound
technology across China during the 1980s allowed parents to observe and exercise
1See Lhila and Simon (2008) for an early contribution in this vein that focused on Asian
immigrants to the US.
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son preference through sex-selective abortion: local access to ultrasound strongly
predicts increased male-to-female ratios at birth (Meng, 2009). If some Chinese
parents had a stronger son preference than others, those choosing to abort females
might have a stronger son preference than those who delivered daughters despite
newfound access to ultrasound. Thus, Meng’s result suggests that with increased
sex ratios, parents were increasingly sorted according to son preference. In this
respect, parents of girls may have benefited from increased investments.
To disentangle the effect of access to prenatal sex determination technology
from parents’ preference for sons, we use data on the year in which ultrasound
machines were introduced into each of the roughly 1,500 counties from issues of the
Local Gazetteers. This data set is then matched with a comprehensive microdata
set that contains more than 500,000 live births in China from 1975 to 1992, a time
of rapid expansion in ultrasound access. Using a difference-in-differences approach,
we compare outcomes of females versus males before and after the introduction of
ultrasound. Furthermore, our data allow us restrict comparisons to those within
the family by including maternal fixed effects, which can address biases arising from
differences across families, e.g. in fertility behavior and son preference. In our richest
specification, the effects of ultrasound availability are identified using variation in
ultrasound between children in the same families, after controlling flexibly for year
fixed effects, county fixed effects, county time trends, and observed characteristics
of the mother.
We find that postnatal investments do not seem to change as a result of
preference-sorting induced by the availability of ultrasound. Nevertheless, we es-
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timate a sizable increase in female neonatal mortality relative to male neonatal
mortality following ultrasound availability. No significant effects are found for post-
neonatal mortality measures, which implies that the effect of the availability of
ultrasound on child health are concentrated soon after birth. Overall, these mor-
tality results suggest that parents withheld investment in female fetuses relative to
males after prenatal sex determination became available.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides nec-
essary background about son preference and the diffusion of diagnostic ultrasound
in China. Section 3 discusses the ways in which the knowledge of fetal gender may
affect parental investment in children. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy.
Section 5 discusses the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6
reports the empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Son Preference and Gender Bias in China
China has a long history of son preference (see, e.g., Banister 1987 or Edlund
1999). The concept of male superiority is part of the Confucian values that are
deeply rooted in Chinese culture. This tradition stresses the importance of continu-
ing the family line through male offspring, and thereby reinforcing male dominance
within a household. These values shaped marriage patterns and family structures
that were strictly patriarchal.
In a patriarchal family, sons may be more valued more than daughters for
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economic reasons. Daughters are usually lost to their natal family after marriage.
Sons, however, normally stay with their parents and are expected to provide labor
for the farm or family business. Parents also have to depend on their sons for old-age
support.
The strongest evidence of gender bias in China has been an abnormally high
sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) at birth. It has been estimated that
tens of millions of Chinese women are “missing” (Coale, 1991; Sen, 1990, 1992).
Sen (1992) suggested that a substantial excess female mortality was responsible for
the huge deficit of females in China. The recent years have seen a worsening of the
“missing women” problem in China as the ratio of male to female births contin-
ued to rise significantly. Recent studies suggested that the primary explanation for
China’s risng sex ratio at birth since the 1980s is sex-selective abortion (Ebenstein,
forthcoming; Meng, 2009). The previous literature has also documented discrimina-
tion against surviving girls. For example, there is empirical evidence which shows
that girls have lower school enrollment rate relative to boys (Brown and Park, 2002;
Gong et al., 2005). More recently, there are a number of studies that document
gender bias against girls in intra-household allocation (Burgess and Zhuang, 2001;
Park and Rukumnuaykit, 2004).
3.2.2 Ultrasound and Prenatal Sex Determination
While there exist a variety of reliable diagnostic procedures for fetal sex deter-
mination, ultrasound examination is used most frequently in China because it is the
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least expensive and most easily accessible method.2 Ultrasound-B machines were
originally designed for diagnostic purposes such as monitoring fetal development and
checking intrauterine device placement. Ultrasound examination is also capable of
prenatal sex identification, based on direct visualization of the external genitalia
of the developing fetus. The accuracy of the technique is substantially improved
from 15 to 16 weeks of gestation onwards.3 With the recent development of high-
resolution ultrasound equipment, and with the advent of transvaginal sonography
(TVS), a diagnosis (although relatively inaccurate) can be made even as early as
11 weeks (Whitlow et al., 1999; Efrat et al., 1999). Most, if not all, of the obstetric
ultrasound scans in China in the study period were by transabdominal sonography
(TAS), and the lower-resolution equipment hindered accurate fetal sex determina-
tion in early pregnancy. The diagnostic procedure of ultrasound scan is painless and
safe, with results immediately available at the time of visit. More importantly, the
service is relatively inexpensive and readily affordable by any ordinary household.
In China, it has been the most prevalent form of prenatal sex determination since
its introduction.
In 1979, China was able to manufacture its very first ultrasound-B machine.
Since the early 1980s, large numbers of imported and Chinese-made ultrasound
machines have been introduced into the market. By 1987, the number of ultrasound-
B machines being used in hospitals and clinics was estimated to exceed 13,000,
2Other modern methods of prenatal sex determination include chorionic villous sampling, am-
niocentesis, hematological tests, and so on.
3For a review of the medical literature on this subject, see, for example, Mielke et al. (1998).
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or roughly six machines per county. According to official records, the number of
imported ultrasound machines peaked in the late 1980s; over 2,000 state-of-the-
art color ultrasound machines were imported in 1989 alone. It was also estimated
that in the early 1990s, China had the capacity to produce over 10,000 machines
annually, the equivalent of four additional machines per year for each county. By
the mid-1990s, all county hospitals and clinics, as well as most township clinics and
family planning service stations, were equipped with ultrasound devices that could
be used for prenatal sex identification.
The popularization of ultrasound has made sex selection easier. Concurrent
with the rapid growth of access to ultrasound, China witnessed an unprecedented
rise in the sex ratio at birth during the 1980s (Chu, 2001). In 1989, having realized
the potential disastrous consequences of the abuse of this technology, the Chinese
government outlawed fetal sex determination for non-medical purposes and legis-
lated substantial penalties for physicians performing such tests. The government
regulations, however, proved ineffectual in practice. The misuse of ultrasound was
often hard to police, and doctors continued to do so as a favor to relatives, friends,
or people who paid bribes (Zeng et al., 1993). In addition, the problem was made
worse by the incentive structure under the One Child Policy. After all, the local offi-
cials who were pressed to meet the birth planning targets that emphasized solely the
number of births would rather turn a blind eye at the use of sex-selective abortions
than pay the consequences of missing their targets.
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3.3 Hypothesized Effects of Knowing the Fetal Gender
First, consider the case of postnatal investment. Apparently before diagnostic
ultrasound was available, parents would know the fetal sex prior to making post-
natal investment decisions. However, the availability of ultrasound makes prenatal
sex selection feasible. If there is heterogeneity in son preference across families, the
increases in the sex ratio at birth after the introduction of ultrasound would sug-
gest that following ultrasound availability, girls are born to parents with weaker son
preference, relative to parents of girls prior to ultrasound. Therefore we hypoth-
esize that postnatal investments in girls would increase relative to boys following
ultrasound availability.
Second, consider the case of prenatal investment. One hypothesized effect of
ultrasound access is to cause a reduction in prenatal investments in girls relative to
boys. Before ultrasound was available, child gender was presumably unknown until
delivery, which would tend to equalize prenatal investment in girls versus boys.
However, after ultrasound was available, parents would have better knowledge of
the fetuses. For those parents whose abortion costs outweigh the distaste for having
a girl, they would decide to carry the baby to term. However if these parents
still favor boys, knowing the fetal gender in advance could induce them to invest
differently. Specifically, they might withhold prenatal investment in female fetuses.
Meanwhile parents would tend to increase investment when they know the fetus
is male with higher certainty. On the other hand, for the same reason as in the
postnatal case, increased preference sorting with ultrasound access would tend to
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increase prenatal investments in girls relative to boys. After all, the prediction
for prenatal investments in girls relative to boys following ultrasound availability is
ambiguous.
3.4 Empirical Approach
Under a difference-in-differences framework, we estimate the difference in the
impact of the introduction of diagnostic ultrasound on birth outcomes and parental
investment measures for female children relative to male children. Specifically, the
estimating equation is:
yijct = β1 girlijct + β2 ultrasoundct + β3 (girlijct × ultrasoundct)
+ Xijctγ + µc + νt + µc × t+ εijct (3.1)
Here i indexes individual birth, j indexes mother, c indexes county, and t indexes
year. yijct is the outcome of interest. girlijct is a binary variable which takes the
value one if the child is female. ultrasoundct is a dummy variable indicating whether
ultrasound technology has been introduced into county c in year t, when the mother
became pregnant. Any gender difference in outcome in the absence of diagnostic
ultrasound is captured by β1. β2 measure the change in outcome for boys after
the introduction of ultrasound. Our key parameter is β3, the coefficient on the
interaction between girlijct and ultrasoundct . It measures the difference between girls
and boys in the change in outcome following the introduction of ultrasound. Xijct is
a vector of individual- and mother-specific controls for ethnicity, maternal education,
maternal age at birth, and its square term. µc is a vector of county of birth indicators
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and νt a vector of year of conception indicators. µc × t is the county specific linear
time trends.
One possible threat to identification is that mothers with potentially worse (or
better) birth outcome could be induced to bear children after the introduction of
diagnostic ultrasound, which is an improvement of the local health facility, and at
the same time can coincide with other improvement of medical technologies within
that area. Suppose the error term εijct consist of a mother-specific component αjc.
Let εijct = αjc +uijct. In estimating Equation (1), selection bias could arise if any of
the mother-specific unobservables are correlated with the availability of ultrasound.
An arguably better way to avoid this possible compositional bias is to estimate a
model with mother fixed effects. By differencing out the with-mother means, the
portion of bias that is due to unobserved mother (or household) characteristics that
are constant across the siblings is eliminated. This second model is given by:
∆yijct = β1 ∆girlijct + β2 ∆ultrasoundct + β3 ∆(girlijct × ultrasoundct)
+ ∆Xijct + ∆νt + ∆(µc × t) + ∆uijct (3.2)
where ∆ differences across siblings. All variables are now of the form ∆xijct =
xijct − x̄jc where x̄jc is the with-mother mean of xijct . In this specification, only
within-mother variation are used for identification and children without any siblings
will be dropped out of the sample. Now β3 is identified by siblings of the opposite
gender and “straddle” the introduction of ultrasound. Comparing the within-mother
estimates from Equation (2) to the between-mother estimates of Equation (1) (using
the sibling sample) gives and idea of the potential selection bias present in the former.
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3.5 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
This paper makes use of two primary data sets. The first data set documents
the timing of county-level ultrasound adoption. This information is collected by ex-
amining many volumes of Local Gazetteer. The Chinese Government has a long tra-
dition, lasting over one thousand years, of publishing issues of Local Gazetteer from
time to time to record the development in a certain locality, typically a province, a
city, or a county. Local Gazetteer is a copious official publication that embraces all
types of information concerning history, economy, administration, culture, develop-
ment, and so on. As such, it is often regarded as the authoritative encyclopedia of
various particular locations in China.
In the early 1980s, the age-old tradition was revived when a new collection
of Local Gazetteers were published to reflect the dramatic social changes that had
taken place since the last major revision in the 1920s. Each local government set up
its own Local Gazetteer Compilation Committee and performed a systematic review
of its jurisdiction in a host of areas. A volume of Local Gazetteer was published
as the final product of this bureaucratic effort. The new Local Gazetteers usually
do not have a uniform framework in general, but most contain a chapter on public
health issues. In this chapter, the time of the introduction of ultrasound machines
was often recorded as a remarkable achievement in the public health sector for many
counties.
The geographic distribution of counties with ultrasound over time is illustrated
by a series of maps of China (see Figure 3.1), where the counties that had the
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ultrasound device between 1980 and 1995 are represented by areas shaded in dark
blue, compared to areas where ultrasound was not yet available, which are denoted
with light blue shading.4 It appears that the technology expansion did not follow
any clear geographic pattern (for example, from the coast to interior areas). Figure
3.2 tabulates the cumulative percentage of counties that had adopted ultrasound in
each year in our data set. A few counties started to have ultrasound machines as
early as 1965 (not shown in the figure). The coverage increased relatively slowly
during the 1970s. Since the early 1980s, the expansion accelerated. In 1985 alone,
over 500 counties adopted ultrasound, and the fraction of counties with ultrasound
devices more than doubled. Virtually all the counties had their own ultrasound
equipment by the end of the 1980s. This tabulation indicates that our microdata
span a period of rapid diffusion of ultrasound technology.
The second data set is a microdata set from the Chinese Children Survey, which
was conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in June 1992. Funding
and support for this project was provided by the United Nations Children’s Fund, the
Ministry of Education of China, the Ministry of Health of China, and the All-China
Women’s Federation. The original purpose of the survey was to study child welfare
in China. This is a large and representative sample of 560,000 households and two
million individuals (including children, their parents, and other family members)
throughout China.
What makes this survey well suited for our analysis is the pregnancy history
form for all women who have ever been pregnant since 1976. The qualified re-
4Grey shaded areas are counties for which the information on ultrasound adoption is unavailable.
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spondents were asked questions regarding each pregnancy. Each pregnancy record
contains information on the pregnancy order, approximate time of conception, use of
prenatal care, gestation length, and its final outcome (miscarriage, induced abortion,
live birth, and others). For live births, gender and date of birth are also recorded.
The mother identifier ensures accurate matching of a given mother’s births and their
respective parities. One of the key variables for identifying in utero ultrasound “ex-
posure” is the year of conception. The data provide the year of conception and the
exact date of birth of each child. For about 1% of the sample, the reported year of
birth is either earlier or two years later than the reported year of conception. In this
case, we use the reported gestation length and year of birth to infer the conception
year to minimize measurement error.
Our analysis is confined to the sample of children born in and after 1975. The
main sample with non-missing ultrasound information contains nearly 300,000 live
births. The summary statistics are described in Table 3.1, Panel A. The top row
of the panel shows that about 47% of the births are boys. The implied sex ratio
at birth is 113, well above the biological norm of 105 boys per 100 girls. The next
rwo shows that for around 36% of the births in the sample, ultrasound machines
have already been introduced into the county when the mother became pregnant.
It is unfortunate that prenatal investment of individuals is not observed in our
data. Instead, only information on the early-life mortality is available. Neonatal
mortality, which is infant death within 28 days of life, is usually linked to the health
environment during pregnancy (Grossman and Jacobowitz, 1981). It is therefore
useful to use the neonatal mortality as an outcome variable that may capture the
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impacts on child survival through prenatal investment on which we do not have
data. The next set of rows presents infant mortalities. Each of the infant mortality
varaibles takes on the value one if a birth dies in a certain period of time and 0
otherwise. The infant mortality rate is about 7 deaths within 28 days of birth (aka.
neontal infant mortality) per 1,000 births. Roughly 80% of the neonatal infant
deaths occur within 7 days of birth and around 40% within 24 hours. In addition,
the post-neontal mortality rate (infant death within 28 days to 1 year) is around 3
deaths per 1,000 neontal surviors.
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents summary information for the subsample with
postnatal parental investment variables. Because questions on parental inputs are
asked only for children born after June 1987, the sample size is reduced accordingly.
The vaccination variable is an indicator variable for whether the child received any
of the standard childhood vaccines for BCG, IPV, DPTa and measles.5 The vacci-
nation rate in China is fairly low, ranges from 16% - 25% depending on the type of
vaccine. In contrast, over 97% of children were ever breastfed. This suggests that
breastfeeding was widespread in China, compared to childhood vaccination. The
mean duration of breastfeeding is 14.9 months. Lastly, around 85% of the children
were being taken care of by their mothers.
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for the sibling subsample. This
subsample contains live births with at least one other sibling identified within the
cohorts 1975 to 1992. The means and standard deviations for most of the observable
5BCG, is a vaccine for Tuberculosis (TB); IPV helps prevent Poliomyelitis (Polio) and DPTa
protects against diphteria, pertussis and tetanus.
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characteristics of the sibling sample are very similar to those from the entire sample.
The only exception is that there is a lower percentage of the siblings “exposed” to
ultrasound. This is possibly because the children born in the later part of our
sampling window are more likely to be “exposed” to ultrasound, and are at the
same time less likely to have siblings due to the tightening One Child Policy under
way.
3.6 Results
Table 3.3 shows the effect of ultrasound on infant mortality. The subsequent
tables presenting results with different outcome variables have a similar structure.
The first column displays the coefficients on the female indicator, ultrasound in-
dicator and their interaction term. These results are from the linear model for
whether an infant died in a certain period of time regressed on the female indicator,
ultrasound indicator and their interaction, plus controls for birth order indicators,
ethnicity, mother’s age and age squared, mother’s education, county fixed effects,
year fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. The second column shows
the same regression, but for the subsample of births with at least one other sibling
identified. In the third column, the coefficients displayed correspond to the regres-
sion model that now includes mother fixed effects. County fixed effects are dropped
accordingly. For all regressions in our study, standard errors are adjusted for serial
correlation by clustering at the county level.
The top panel in Table 3.3 shows the results from estimating equation (1)
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using infant mortality within 24 hours as the dependent variable. For all specifi-
cations, the coefficients on the female indicator are always small in magnitude and
statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting no systematic difference in in-
fant mortality within 24 hours between boys and girls before ultrasound is available.
The full sample results suggest that the availability of ultrasound has a positive re-
lationship with the probability of death within 24 hours for male infants. When we
use only the sibling sample in column (2), this relationship more than doubles and is
also highly significant. The positive association between ultrasound availability and
infant death is somewhat surprising since the introduction of diagnostic sound is
normally considered an improvement in the technology of prenatal care. One plau-
sible explanation would be that the availability of better medical technology might
have induced more disadvantaged women to bear children that are more likely to die
young, and if this compositional effect dominates the health benefits of ultrasound,
one could observe an increase in the overall infant mortality rate. In column (3),
after adding mother fixed effect in the sibling sample, the coefficient on ultrasound
becomes negative and is no longer significant at conventional levels. The mother
fixed effect estimate implies that the introduction of ultrasound may in fact improve
the health of newborn male infants, and the between-estimator of ultrasound might
be biased due to selection. For the interaction term, both the full sample and sibling
sample using OLS produce positive and statistically significant coefficients with the
similar magnitude. However, after including mother fixed effects, the estimate al-
most doubles, suggesting an impact of 0.19 percentage point increase in the one-day
mortality for girls relative to boys with the introduction of ultrasound.
75
The bottom panel in Table 3.3 presents the results for infant mortality within
7 days of life. Once again, the coefficients on the female indicator from all three
specifications are small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero,
which indicates no systematic difference in infant mortality within 7 days between
boys and girls before ultrasound. Interestingly, the same contrast in results across
specification arises when we compare the coefficients on ultrasound using the entire
sample and the sibling sample with and without mother fixed effects. The full sample
results suggest that the availability of ultrasound is associated with a 0.14 percentage
point increase in the probability of death within 7 days for male infants. When we
use only the sibling sample, this relationship more than doubles. However, after
including mother fixed effect in the sibling sample, the coefficient on ultrasound
becomes negative and is significant at the 1% level, suggesting a 0.28 percentage
point decrease in one-week mortality for boys after the introduction of ultrasound.
A similar pattern for the coefficients on the interaction term is also found for one-
week mortality as for the one-day mortality. Both the full sample and sibling sample
using OLS give positive and statistically significant coefficients with the similar
magnitude and adding mother fixed effects doubles the estimates. The implied
effect of ultrasound is a 0.25 percentage point increase in the one-week mortality for
girls relative to boys.
The top panel in Table 3.4 displays the results from estimating equation (1)
using infant mortality within 28 days as the outcome variable. Recall that roughly
80% of the neonatal infant deaths occur within 7 days of life. Not surprisingly, the
results are very similar to the 7-days results, which suggest that the introduction of
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ultrasound has a positive impact on the neonatal mortality for girls relative to boys.
The bottom panel in Table 3.4 shows the results for infant mortality within
28 days to 1 year as the outcome variable, conditional on survival until 28 days
of age. For all three specifications, the coefficients on the girl indicator are always
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, indicating no systematic difference
in post-neonatal mortality between boys and girls before ultrasound. The least-
squares results without mother fixed effect indicate a positive relationship between
ultrasound availability and infant death within 28 days to 1 year. The point estimate
increases substantially from using only the sibling sample. Once again, the estimate
becomes negative, although no longer significant. Unlike the case with neonatal
mortalities, the coefficients on the interaction term between ultrasound and girl
indicators are small in size and statistically insignificant. Furthermore, the point
estimate gravitates towards zero after including mother fixed effects. Our results
suggest that ultrasound access has no further effect on the difference in survival
between boys and girls once the child survived the neonatal stage.
The infant mortality results presented thus far suggest that the availability
of ultrasound has a disproportionate impact on the probability of death soon after
birth for girls relative to boys. The estimates imply that about 70% of the effect of
ultrasound on the girl-boy difference in neonatal mortality is due to increase in the
difference in infant death within 24 hours of birth. By contrast, ultrasound does
not seem to have any effect on relative mortality if the child has survived the first
month of life. Taken together, these results show that the effect of ultrasound on
relative mortality of girls is concentrated soon after birth, which suggest that the
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knowledge of fetal gender might cause parents to withhold prenatal investment in
female fetuses, which decreases the probability of survival of girls relative to boys
during the neonatal period.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 explore the relationship between ultrasound availability
and gender imbalance in childhood vaccination. Specifically, an indicator variable
for whether the child is vaccinated is regressed on the gender indicator, ultrasound
indicator and their interaction term. The same sets of control variables are included
as in the previous analysis of infant mortality. We observe vaccination receipt in-
formation for four types of vaccines, namely vaccines against BCG, IPV, DTPa and
measles.
The top panel in Table 3.5 shows the estimated effects of ultrasound on the
probability of receiving vaccine type 1, i.e. the vaccine against BCG. The cross-
section results using either the entire sample or the sibling sample reveal no signif-
icant gender difference in vaccination before ultrasound. However the sibling fixed
effects analysis in column (3) indicates a non-intuitive female advantage in receipt
of vaccination and the point estimate is significant at the 10% level. For all three
specifications, the coefficients on the ultrasound indicator and the girl-ultrasound
interaction are always statistically insignificant, which provide little evidence of any
impact of ultrasound on receiving vaccination type 1 for both genders.
The bottom panel in Table 3.5 shows the analysis for vaccine type 2, i.e. the
vaccine against IPV. Interestingly, the coefficients on the girl indicator are uniformly
positive in all three columns and statistically significant at least at the 10% level,
which indicates a clear female advantage in receipt of vaccination type 2. The least-
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squares estimates for the ultrasound effect are small and statistically insignificant.
The mother fixed effect estimate of ultrasound, however, is negative and significant
at the 10% level, which indicate that the introduction of ultrasound is associated
with a 1.7 percentage points decrease in receipt of IPV vaccination for boys. For
all three specifications, the coefficients on the girl-ultrasound interaction are never
statistically significant at conventional levels, which provide little evidence of any
effect of ultrasound on receiving vaccination type 2 for girls relative to boys.
The top panel in Table 3.6 shows the results for vaccine type 3, i.e. the vaccine
against DTPa. We find some evidence of female advantage of getting this particular
type of vaccine. The coefficient from full-sample on the female indicator is positive
and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient remains virtually unchanged once we
use the sibling sample with or without mother fixed effects, although the effect is less
precisely measured. For all three specifications, the coefficients on the ultrasound
indicator and the girl-ultrasound interaction are always statistically insignificant,
which reveals little evidence of the effect of ultrasound on receiving vaccination type
3 for both genders.
The bottom panel in Table 3.6 shows the results for vaccine type 4, i.e. the
vaccine against measles. We find a substantial female advantage of getting this
particular type of vaccine. The estimate of the gender difference barely changes
across specifications and is always statistically significant. Once again, we find no
substantial difference in receipt of vaccine type 4 for boys after the introduction of
ultrasound. Moreover, estimates of the interaction effect of gender and ultrasound
from different specification are not suggestive of any effect of ultrasound on receiving
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vaccination type 4 for girls relative to boys.
Table 3.7 shows the effect of ultrasound on postnatal investments. The top
panel presents the analysis of breastfeeding. The outcome of interest is an indicator
for whether the child has ever been breastfed by the mother. The estimates for
the female indicator from all the specifications reveal no significant difference in
the rate of breastfeeding across genders. The introduction of ultrasound does not
seem to have a significant effect on the probability of breastfeeding for boys. The
least-squares estimates for the interaction effect are small and statistically insignifi-
cant. The mother fixed effect estimate of the interaction effect, however, is negative
and significant at the 1% level, and its magnitude implies that the introduction of
ultrasound is associated with a 1.3 percentage points decrease in breastfeeding for
girls relative to boys.
The next panel in Table 3.7 reports the results for the duration of breast-
feeding. The dependent variable is the duration of breastfeeding in months. The
cross-section results suggest that breastfeeding duration are longer for boys before
ultrasound and this relationship holds even after adding in mother fixed effect. The
within-mother estimate indicates that before ultrasound daughters receive 0.7 month
less of breastfeeding relative to sons. The between-mother estimates using the whole
sample and the sibling sample indicate that the introduction of ultrasound is asso-
ciated with a roughly 0.2 month increase in the breastfeeding duration for male
children. Including mother fixed effect hardly changes the size of the coefficient,
although it is measured less precisely. Moreover, none of the estimates of the inter-
action effect of gender and ultrasound from different specification is suggestive of
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any impact of ultrasound on the length of breastfeeding for girls relative to boys.
Finally, the bottom panel in Table 3.7 displays the results for whether the
child was taken care of by his or her mother. We implicitly assumes that the mother
has the natural comparative advantage of taking care of her children and the child
should be better off being taken care of by his or her mother. The estimates for
the female indicator from all the specifications reveal no significant difference in the
probability of being taken care of by mother across genders. The introduction of
ultrasound does not seem to have a significant effect on the probability of being taken
care of by mother for boys. Moreover, none of the estimates of the interaction effect
of gender and ultrasound from different specification is suggestive of any impact of
ultrasound on the probability of being taken care of by mother for girls relative to
boys.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of whether parental investment decisions
change when they are able to know child gender during pregnancy in China. It does
this by using both time and cross-section variation in local access to prenatal sex
determination caused by the differential introduction of diagnostic ultrasound into
Chinese counties during the 1980s. Furthermore, we include maternal fixed effects
to control for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of the mother. We find little
evidence of any change in postnatal investments as a result of preference-sorting
caused by the access to ultrasound. Nevertheless, we estimate a sizable increase
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in female neonatal mortality relative to male neonatal mortality after ultrasound
was introduced. Further, our empirical analysis reveals no significant effects for
post-neonatal mortality measures, which implies that the effect of the availability
of ultrasound on child health are concentrated soon after birth. Taken together,
our results for infant mortality measure indicate that parent withheld investment in
female fetuses relative to males after ultrasound became available.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
      
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
      
NP94 1946 0.28 0.45 0 1 
1992 rural net income per capita (1992 price) 1946 646.80 292.18 119 2482 
1994 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1796 1021.10 498.12 221 3866 
2000 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1906 1717.67 820.77 280 5777 
2003 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1910 1920.69 948.10 361 6732 
Change in log income per capita 94-00 1758 0.52 0.40 -1.12 2.06 
Change in log income per capita 94-03 1761 0.64 0.39 -1.01 2.29 
National Poor County before 1994 1946 0.16 0.36 0 1 
1994 population 1806 469219 330401 7229 2079895 
1994 sown area (10,000 Mu) 1797 99.00 71.19 1 438 
1994 grain production per capita (Kg) 1790 424.24 198.68 2.21 2029.54 
1994 fiscal  expenditure per capita 1698 213.36 244.91 0.68 5546.32 
      
Notes: 
The major data set is collected by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
NP94 is an indicator variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor County in 1994. 
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Table 1.2: County-level covariates by Poor County status 
    
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    
    
National Poor Counties    
    
1992 rural net income per capita (1992 price) 549 409.36 122.81 
1994 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 491 634.20 212.46 
2000 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 539 1259.65 568.3 
2003 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 539 1402.92 594.1 
Change in log income per capita 94-00 481 0.65 0.46 
Change in log income per capita 94-03 481 0.78 0.42 
Population in 1994 502 367316 278826 
1994 sown area per (Mu) 498 83.58 59.31 
1994 Grain production per capita (Kg) 498 342.63 137.82 
1994 Industrial income per capita 463 187.72 153.73 
    
    
Non-National Poor Counties    
    
1992 rural net income per capita (1992 price) 1397 740.12 286.59 
1994 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1305 1166.66 497.02 
2000 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1367 1898.26 834.77 
2003 rural net income per capita (1994 price) 1371 2124.25 983.35 
Change in log income per capita 94-00 1277 0.48 0.37 
Change in log income per capita 94-03 1280 0.59 0.37 
Population in 1994 1304 508448 340278 
1994 sown area per capita (Mu) 1299 104.91 74.43 
1994 Grain production per (Kg) 1292 455.70 209.36 
1994 Industrial income per capita 1235 222.98 270.74 
    
    
Notes: 
The major data set is collected by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-differences results for 1994-2000 change in log income per capita 
    
 Dependent variable: change in log income per capita 94-00 
    
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
    
NP94 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Controls    
    County-level factors N Y Y 
    Provincial dummies N N Y 
    
R2 0.04 0.06 0.15 
Sample size 1758 1655 1655 
    
Notes: NP94 is an indicator variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor 
County in 1994. County-level controls include the population, sown area, grain production per capita 
and industrial income per capita in 1994.  All regressions control for county-type dummies.   Huber-
White standard errors are in parentheses.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 
5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 1.4: First-stage, reduced-form, and 2SLS results for 94-00 change in log income per capita, 
using eligibility for NP94 as an instrument 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Panel A: 1st stage (Dependent variable : NP94) 
     
Eligible 0.64*** 0.56*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
     
R2 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.67 
     
     
Panel B: reduced-form (Dependent variable: Change in log income per capita 94-00) 
     
Eligible 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
R2 0.17 0.24 0.25 0.25 
     
Panel C: 2SLS (Dependent variable: Change in log income per capita 94-00) 
     
NP94 0.53*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
     
Notes on all panels     
   Running variable N Y Y Y 
   Cubic in running variable N N Y Y 
   Other county-level controls N N N Y 
     
Sample size 1758 1758 1758 1655 
     
Notes: NP94 is an indicator variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor 
County in 1994.  Eligible is an indicator variable that equals one if the county’s 1994 rural net income 
per capita was below the poverty line.  County-level controls include the population, sown area, grain 
production per capita and industrial income per capita in 1994.  All regressions control for county-type 
and provincial dummies.   Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  *denotes statistical 




Table 1.5: 2SLS results for 94-00 change in log income per capita, using eligibility for NP94 as an 
instrument 
  Full sample   ±1000 yuan   ±500 yuan  
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
NP94 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.42** 0.33* 0.40* 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.18) (0.20) (0.23) 
       
       
Polynomial  3 4 3 4 3 4 
terms       
       
Sample size 1655 1618 1400 
       
Notes: The dependent variable is the 94-00 change in log income per capita.   NP94 is an indicator 
variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor County in 1994.  Eligible is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the county’s 1994 rural net income per capita was below the 
poverty line.  County-level controls include the population, sown area, grain production per capita and 
industrial income per capita in 1994.  All regressions control for county-type and provincial dummies.   
Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 





Table 1.6: 2SLS results for 94-03 change in log income per capita, using eligibility for NP94 as an 
instrument 
  Full sample   ±1000 yuan   ±500 yuan  
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
NP94 0.22** 0.23** 0.29*** 0.31* 0.18 0.21 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) 
       
       
Polynomial  3 4 3 4 3 4 
terms       
       
Sample size 1657 1619 1401 
       
Notes: The dependent variable is the 94-03 change in log income per capita.   NP94 is an indicator 
variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor County in 1994.  Eligible is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the county’s 1994 rural net income per capita was below the 
poverty line.  County-level controls include the population, sown area, grain production per capita and 
industrial income per capita in 1994.  All regressions control for county-type and provincial dummies.   
Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 




Table 1.7: 2SLS results for 92-94 change in log income per capita, using eligibility for NP94 as an 
instrument 
  Full sample   ±1000 yuan   ±500 yuan  
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
NP94 -0.010 -0.016 -0.011 0.036 0.081 0.053 
 (0.041) (0.10) (0.048) (0.079) (0.091) (0.097) 
       
       
Polynomial  3 4 3 4 3 4 
terms       
       
Sample size 1655 1618 1400 
       
Notes: The dependent variable is the 92-94 change in log income per capita.  NP94 is an indicator 
variable that equals to one if the county was designated as a National Poor County in 1994.  Eligible is 
an indicator variable that equals one if the county’s 1994 rural net income per capita was below the 
poverty line.  County-level controls include the population, sown area, grain production per capita and 
industrial income per capita in 1994.  All regressions control for county-type and provincial dummies.   
Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** 




Table 2.1: Summary statistics 
    
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    
    
Panel A: Pregnancies    
    
Birth 614408 0.84 0.37 
Abortion 614408 0.13 0.33 
Miscarriage 614408 0.03 0.16 
Still birth 614408 0.004 0.060 
    
Panel B: Births    
    
Male child 512201 0.53 0.50 
First birth 512201 0.60 0.49 
Second birth 512201 0.29 0.45 
Third (or higher order) birth 512201 0.12 0.32 
Urban 514389 0.30 0.46 
Han 514389 0.87 0.34 
Maternal education 514389 5.86 4.22 
Maternal age (at conception) 514389 26.34 7.33 
Household income (in 1992) 501333 3816.35 3221.12 
Gestation (months) 514389 9.28 0.56 
No prenatal care 514389 0.47 0.50 
First trimester initial visit 514389 0.18 0.39 
Second trimester initial visit 514389 0.16 0.37 
Third trimester initial visit 514389 0.16 0.37 
Ultrasound (available in county) 299935 0.41 0.49 
    
Notes: 
Panel A contains pregnancies that started between January 1974 and June 1992. 
Panel B contains births occurred between January 1975 and June 1992.  
Both samples are from the Chinese Children Survey.   
Information on ultrasound access is collected by the author. 
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Table 2.2 : Effect of birth order on male probability: linear probability model results 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Second birth 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Third (or higher order) birth 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
     
     
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes 
     
     
     
Observations 512207 512207 512207 512207 
R-squared 0.0008 0.0011 0.0032 0.0035 
     
Notes: Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its 
squared term, gestation length and indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed 
effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for 
unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered 




Table 2.3 : Effect of birth order, ultrasound availability, and their interactions on male probability: 
linear probability model results 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Second birth 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Third (or higher order) birth 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
First birth × Ultrasound 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
     
Second birth × Ultrasound 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Third (or higher order) birth 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.024*** 
× Ultrasound (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
     
     
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes 
     
Observations 298615 298615 298615 298615 
R-squared 0.0010 0.0014 0.0033 0.0036 
     
Notes: Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its 
squared term, gestation length and indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed 
effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for 
unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered 




Table 2.4 : Effect of ultrasound, sex composition of the first child, and their interactions on male 
probability: linear probability model results from the second births 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
First child is female 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
Ultrasound -0.004 -0.009* -0.003 -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
     
First child is female × 
Ultrasound 
0.047*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
     
     
     
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes 
     
Observations 86351 86351 86351 86351 
R-squared 0.0041 0.0048 0.0108 0.0113 
     
Notes: Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its 
squared term, gestation length and indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed 
effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for 
unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered 




Table 2.5 : Effect of ultrasound, sex composition of the first two children, and their interactions on 
male probability: linear probability model results from the third births 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
First two children are both 
female 
0.083*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Ultrasound 0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) 
     
First two children are both 
female  
0.065*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 
× Ultrasound (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
     
     
     
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes 
     
Observations 26958 26958 26958 26958 
R-squared 0.0143 0.0165 0.0310 0.0315 
     
Notes: Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its 
squared term, gestation length and indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed 
effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for 
unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered 
by county.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.6 : The effect of ultrasound availability, and its interactions with local One Child Policy 
enforcement on male probability: linear probability model results 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
First birth × Ultrasound -0.008* -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Second birth × Ultrasound 0.011** 0.010** 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    
Third (or higher order) birth × Ultrasound 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    
Birth rate × First birth  0.032 0.021 
  (0.045) (0.052) 
    
Birth rate × Second birth  -0.097* -0.010 
  (0.056) (0.069) 
    
Birth rate × Third (or higher order) birth  -0.149** -0.051 
  (0.074) (0.093) 
    
Birth rate × Ultrasound × First birth   0.011 
   (0.072) 
    
Birth rate × Ultrasound × Second birth   -0.197** 
   (0.094) 
    
Birth rate × Ultrasound × Third (or higher order) 
birth   
-0.211* 
   0.0037 
    
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Sample After 1979 After 1979 After 1979 
    
Observations 257528 257508 257508 
R-squared 0.0037 0.0037 0.0037 
    
Notes: Birth rate is calculated as the number of births divided by the number of women aged 15-49 in 
the county during the year when the mother became pregnant.  For meaningful comparison of 
estimates across columns, birth rate is demeaned using the sample average.  Individual controls include 
mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its squared term, gestation length and 
indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed effects are separate indicator 
variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for unrestricted differences in 
year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered by county.  *denotes 




Table 2.7 : The estimated effect of ultrasound availability on male probability under strong, medium 
and weak implementation of the One Child Policy 
  
 Dependent var.: child is male 
    
Enforcement of One Child Policy: Strong Medium Weak 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
First birth × Ultrasound -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
    
Second birth × Ultrasound 0.015*** 0.009* 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
    
Third (or higher order) birth × 
Ultrasound 
0.026*** 0.020*** 0.013 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) 
    
    
Evaluation at 25th percentile median 75th percentile 
 of the birth rate of the birth rate of the birth rate 
    
    
Notes: Birth rate is calculated as the number of births divided by the number of women aged 15-49 in 
the county during the year when the mother became pregnant.  Individual controls include mother's 
ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its squared term, gestation length and indicators 
for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed effects are separate indicator variables for 
each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators that allow for unrestricted differences in year-to-year 
changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered by county.  *denotes statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.8 : Robustness of  the effect of birth orders, ultrasound availability, and their interactions on 
male probability: linear probability model results 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
First birth × Ultrasound -0.008* -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
     
Second birth × Ultrasound 0.011** 0.012** 0.013*** 0.011** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
     
Third (or higher order) birth 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
× Ultrasound (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
     
     
Ultrasound next year    -0.004 
    (0.006) 
     
Second birth    -0.001 
× Ultrasound next year    (0.009) 
     
Third (or higher order) birth    0.003 
× Ultrasound next year    (0.011) 
     
     
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sample  After 1980 After 1980 Whole sample Whole sample 
     
1980 county variables  No Yes No No 
× Linear time × Birth orders     
     
     
Observations 278393 266962 298615 298615 
R-squared 0.0036 0.0037 0.0036 0.0036 
     
Notes: “Ultrasound next year” is an indicator for whether the county gets ultrasound next year to test 
for pre-trends.  Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception 
and its squared term, gestation length and indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  
County fixed effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed effects are indicators 
that allow for unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard 
errors clustered by county.  *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at 





Table 2.9 : Heterogeneity in Effects of ultrasound availability on male probability: OLS results 
 Dependent var.: child is male 
  
By groups Ethnicity Residency Maternal education Household income 







Urban Rural < median ≥ median < median ≥ median 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
First birth × Ultrasound -0.007 -0.011 0.002 -0.010** -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
         
Second birth × Ultrasound 0.014*** 0.006 0.022** 0.010** 0.024** 0.008 0.017*** 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
         
Third (or higher order) birth 0.027*** 0.008 0.038** 0.021*** 0.040*** 0.015* 0.021** 0.027*** 
× Ultrasound (0.007) (0.017) (0.016) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
         
         
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year (of conception) fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 263991 34624 83205 215410 89035 209580 145604 153011 
R-squared 0.0040 0.0111 0.0066 0.0044 0.0066 0.0040 0.0055 0.0042 
         
Notes: Individual controls include mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at conception and its squared term, gestation length and 
indicators for the timing of initial prenatal care visits.  County fixed effects are separate indicator variables for each county.  Year fixed 
effects are indicators that allow for unrestricted differences in year-to-year changes.  Reported in parentheses are standard errors 




Table 3.1: Summary statistics (samples with ultrasound information) 
    
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    
    
Panel A    
Subsample with mortality measures    
    
Girl 284728 0.468 0.499 
Ultrasound 284728 0.360 0.480 
Death within 24 hours of birth 284728 0.003 0.056 
Death within 7 days of birth 284728 0.006 0.075 
Death within 28 days of birth 284728 0.007 0.084 
Death within 28 days to 1 year 282711 0.003 0.055 
    
Panel B    
Subsample with postnatal measures    
    
Girl 93967 0.458 0.498 
Ultrasound 93967 0.361 0.480 
Vaccine 1 (BCG) 93601 0.159 0.366 
Vaccine 2 (IPV) 93600 0.157 0.363 
Vaccine 3 (DTPa) 93600 0.192 0.394 
Vaccine 4 (Measles) 93600 0.254 0.435 
Breastfeeding 93968 0.971 0.167 
Duration of breastfeeding (months) 91263 14.842 7.843 
Taken care of by mother 93967 0.846 0.361 
    
Notes: 
The samples are taken from the Chinese Children Survey.   




Table 3.2: Summary statistics (sibling sample with ultrasound information) 
    
Variables Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
    
    
Panel A    
Subsample with mortality measures    
    
Girl 243482 0.468 0.499 
Ultrasound 243482 0.307 0.461 
Death within 24 hours of birth 243482 0.003 0.059 
Death within 7 days of birth 243482 0.006 0.080 
Death within 28 days of birth 243482 0.008 0.089 
Death within 28 days to 1 year 241557 0.003 0.058 
    
Panel B    
Subsample with postnatal measures    
    
Girl 80121 0.458 0.498 
Ultrasound 80121 0.308 0.462 
Vaccine 1 (BCG) 79926 0.163 0.369 
Vaccine 2 (IPV) 79926 0.159 0.365 
Vaccine 3 (DTPa) 79926 0.195 0.396 
Vaccine 4 (Measles) 79926 0.257 0.437 
Breastfeeding 80122 0.971 0.168 
Duration of breastfeeding (months) 77806 14.852 7.868 
Taken care of by mother 80121 0.846 0.361 
    
Notes: 
The samples are taken from the Chinese Children Survey.   




Table 3.3: The effect of ultrasound on mortality: with and without mother fixed effects 
  
 Full sample Sibling sample Sibling sample 
  No mother FE With mother FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Death within 24 hours of birth 
    
Girl 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0007** 0.0016*** -0.0009 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0009** 0.0010* 0.0019*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
    
Observations 284254 243132 243132 
R-squared 0.0033 0.0037 0.0033 
    
 Death within 7 days of birth 
    
Girl -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0014*** 0.0031*** -0.0028*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0014** 0.0013* 0.0025*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
    
Observations 284254 243132 243132 
R-squared 0.0035 0.0043 0.0038 
    
    
County fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County time trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Notes: Individual controls include birth order indicators, mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at 
conception and its squared term.  Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
parentheses;  




Table 3.4: The effect of ultrasound on mortality: with and without mother fixed effects (continued) 
  
 Full sample Sibling sample Sibling sample 
  No mother FE With mother FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Death within 28 days of birth 
    
Girl -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0020*** 0.0042*** -0.0033*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0013** 0.0011 0.0026** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0011) 
    
Observations 284254 243132 243132 
R-squared 0.0037 0.0047 0.0041 
    
 Death within 28 days to 1 year† 
    
Girl -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0008** 0.0018*** -0.0007 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
    
Observations 282240 241210 241210 
R-squared 0.0035 0.0041 0.0036 
    
    
County fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County time trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Notes: Individual controls include birth order indicators, mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at 
conception and its squared term.  Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
parentheses;  
*denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level; analysis of 
infant death within 28 days to 1 year are conducted for neonatal survivors. 
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Table 3.5: The effect of ultrasound on vaccination: with and without mother fixed effects 
  
 Full sample Sibling sample Sibling sample 
  No mother FE With mother FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Vaccine 1 
    
Girl 0.0032 0.0030 0.0068* 
 (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0041) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0132 
 (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0099) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0017 0.0007 0.0079 
 (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0084) 
    
Observations 93454 79816 79816 
R-squared 0.1769 0.1812 0.0276 
    
 Vaccine 2 
    
Girl 0.0061** 0.0057** 0.0082* 
 (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0044) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0023 -0.0009 -0.0165* 
 (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0097) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl -0.0040 -0.0002 0.0030 
 (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0083) 
    
Observations 93453 79816 79816 
R-squared 0.1261 0.1288 0.0373 
    
    
County fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County time trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Notes: Individual controls include birth order indicators, mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at 
conception and its squared term.  Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
parentheses;  




Table 3.6: The effect of ultrasound on vaccination: with and without mother fixed effects (continued) 
  
 Full sample Sibling sample Sibling sample 
  No mother FE With mother FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Vaccine 3 
    
Girl 0.0050* 0.0044 0.0044 
 (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0047) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0123 
 (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0099) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0010 0.0040 0.0065 
 (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0091) 
    
Observations 93453 79816 79816 
R-squared 0.1488 0.1518 0.0416 
    
 Vaccine 4 
    
Girl 0.0116*** 0.0111*** 0.0114** 
 (0.0032) (0.0034)   (0.0051) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0039 0.0046 -0.0026 
 (0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0107) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl -0.0087 -0.0065 -0.0132 
 (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0102) 
    
Observations 93453 79816 79816 
R-squared 0.1531 0.1527 0.0803 
    
    
County fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County time trends Yes Yes Yes 
    
Notes: Individual controls include birth order indicators, mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at 
conception and its squared term.  Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
parentheses;  




Table 3.7: The effect of ultrasound on care: with and without mother fixed effects 
 Full sample Sibling sample Sibling sample 
  No mother FE With mother FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
 Breastfeeding 
    
Girl -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0020 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0022) 
    
Ultrasound 0.0028 0.0019 0.0020 
 (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0043) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0125*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0043) 
    
Observations 93831 80025 80025 
R-squared 0.0384 0.0407 0.0128 
    
 Duration of breastfeeding 
    
Girl -0.6988*** -0.6698*** -0.5756*** 
 (0.0606) (0.0632) (0.0969) 
    
Ultrasound 0.1983*** 0.2286*** 0.2616 
 (0.0751) (0.0848) (0.1818) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0447 0.0042 -0.0925 
 (0.0977) (0.1129) (0.1867) 
    
Observations 91136 77715 77715 
R-squared 0.3440 0.3458 0.3124 
    
 Taken care of by mother 
    
Girl -0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0054 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0041) 
    
Ultrasound -0.0001 0.0022 -0.0072 
 (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0078) 
    
Ultrasound × Girl 0.0017 0.0010 0.0049 
 (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0079) 
    
Observations 93830 80024 80024 
R-squared 0.1403 0.1428 0.0288 
    
County fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
County time trends Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Individual controls include birth order indicators, mother's ethnicity, education, maternal age at 
conception and its squared term.  Standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in 
parentheses; *denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1.1: Incidence of rural poverty in 1991 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2000) 
Notes: Incidence of rural poverty is defined as the number of poor as a percentage of rural population. 
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Source: Park and Wang (2001) 
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Source: Heilig et al. (2006) 
Notes: The National Poor Counties designated in 1994 are denoted by the red shaded regions.
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Notes: Each solid square represents the fraction of counties designated as poor within 10 yuan intervals of 
the 1992 income per capita relative to cutoff.   
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Notes: The continuous line is the predicted outcome from a regression that includes a third order 
polynomial in the running variable, and a dummy for observations above the cutoff.  The dashed lines are 
pointwise 95 percent confidence intervals from the regression. 
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Notes: Panels refer to (from top left to bottom right) the following county attributes: population, sown area 
grain production per capita and budgetary expenditure per capita for the year of 1994.   The continuous line 
represents the predicted value from a fourth order polynomial in the running variable , and a dummy for 
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Notes: The red lines indicate the poverty lines used for 1994 designation. 
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1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Sex Ratio at Birth Abortion Ratio
 
 
Source: Chinese Children Survey, June 1992 
Notes: Sex ratio at birth is defined as the number of male births per 100 female births.  Abortion ratio is 
defined as the proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion. 
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Aggregated to pregnancy year, pregnancy order cells: 1974-1991
1, 2 and 3 denote 1st, 2nd and 3rd pregnancies; 4 indicates 4th and above
 
 
Source: Chinese Children Survey, June 1992 
Notes: Sex ratio at birth is defined as the number of male births per 100 female births.  Abortion ratio is 
defined as the proportion of pregnancies ending in abortion. 
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Source: Chinese Children Survey, June 1992 
Notes: Sex ratio at birth is defined as the number of male births per 100 female births. 
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Figure 2.4: Sex ratio at birth by parity and sex of older sibling(s) over time 
 



























78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Year of birth































78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Year of birth




Source: Chinese Children Survey, June 1992 
Notes: Sex ratio at birth is defined as the number of male births per 100 female births. 
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Figure 2.5: The spread of ultrasound technology across Chinese counties 
 
 
1980       1985 
 
 




Notes: Tabulations of the author’s own dataset on ultrasound introduction at the county level.  The shading 
corresponds to the availability of ultrasound,  where dark blue areas represent counties that had ultrasound; 
light blue areas corresponds to counties without ultrasound and  grey areas are counties for which the 
information on ultrasound adoption is not available. 
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Notes: Tabulations of the author’s own dataset. 
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Figure 2.7: Sex ratio at birth by parity and by availability of ultrasound 
 





















1st birth 2nd birth 3rd+ birth
No ultrasound With ultrasound
 
 
Source: Chinese Children Survey, June 1992 
Notes: Sex ratio at birth is defined as the number of male births per 100 female births. Error bars represent 
95% CI around the sample mean.  The underlying population size is given at the bottom of each bar.  
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Figure 2.8: Estimates from event study analysis 
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Notes: Each figure plots coefficients from an event-study analysis that allows for effects before, during and 
after the adoption of ultrasound.  The full specification is described in Equation (5).  Panel (a) plots ’s, 
the coefficients of the interaction terms of the event year dummy variables and the dummy variable for first 
births.  Panel (b) plots ’s, the coefficients of the interaction terms of the event year dummy variables and 
the dummy variable for second (and above) births. 
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Figure 3.1: The spread of ultrasound technology across Chinese counties  
 
1980       1985 
 
 




Notes: Tabulations of the authors’ own dataset on ultrasound introduction at the county level.  The shading 
corresponds to the availability of ultrasound,  where dark blue areas represent counties that had ultrasound; 
light blue areas corresponds to counties without ultrasound and  grey areas are counties for which the 
information on ultrasound adoption is not available 
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